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THE WORLD ACCORDING TO, AND AFTER,
MCCUTCHEON V. FEC, AND WHY IT MATTERS
Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The editors of the Valparaiso Law Review had the good sense to
hold their symposium conference “Money in Politics: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly” the week the Supreme Court issued its decision in
McCutcheon v. FEC. At the Symposium, one of the authors of this Article,
Liz Kennedy, presented a talk entitled, “The Supreme Court, the
Constitution, and the Crisis of Confidence in American Democracy,”
which explained how the Roberts Court has misunderstood the
democratic interests at stake in its recent campaign finance cases. The
Roberts Court has applied a blinded, highly abstract First Amendment
doctrine that ignores the distortion of democratic responsiveness caused
by big money in politics; current anti-majoritarian policy outcomes
demonstrate the lack of meaningful representation experienced by the
non-wealthy. This type of endemic political inequality constitutes a
corruption of democracy because a democratic system of government is
one in which elected officials are responsive to the views of each citizen
considered as political equals. Accordingly, to the extent that the First
Amendment is understood to be in service to democracy, it cannot be
read as permitting a small, wealthy minority to accrue political power
deriving from their wealth—that, after all, is the definition of a
plutocracy.
This Article expands upon the presentation, further describing the
jurisprudential and policy mistakes made by the controlling plurality in
McCutcheon, including its inconsistency with important precedent.
Specifically, Part II describes McCutcheon’s plurality holding and its
direct practical effects on campaign fundraising.1 Part III explains why
the expected influx of additional money into politics will exacerbate
∗

At the time of the drafting of this Article, the authors were colleagues at Demos, a
public policy organization dedicated to ensuring an equal chance in our economy and an
equal say in our democracy. This Article, however, reflects the viewpoints of the authors
and does not necessarily reflect the positions of Demos. Liz is Counsel at Demos, and was
formerly Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, an associate at
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, and a Senior Associate representing unions in labor and
industrial bankruptcy cases. She received her J.D. cum laude from N.Y.U. School of Law.
Seth received his J.D. from N.Y.U. School of Law in 2007. In addition to working in private
practice, he has clerked for several federal and state judges. For more pieces from the
symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium: Money in Politics: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015).
1
See infra Part II (discussing the McCutcheon decision).
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democratic harms that already damage our republic.2 Part IV considers
McCutcheon’s place in the Court’s prior jurisprudence in this area.3 Part
V discusses the path towards the democracy we deserve.4 Finally, Part
VI concludes by reiterating the movement towards a pro-democracy
understanding of the Constitution.5
II. WHAT DID THE MCCUTCHEON DECISION DO?
Part II describes McCutcheon’s plurality holding and its direct
practical effects on campaign fundraising. It describes how McCutcheon
struck down the aggregate federal contribution limits and discusses how
striking down these limits allows the wealthy to spend even more
money to influence political decisions.
A. McCutcheon Strikes Down the Aggregate Federal Contribution Limits
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four vote,
declared the aggregate federal limits on the amounts a wealthy
individual can contribute overall to candidates, parties, and committees
unconstitutional.6 Alone at one end, Justice Thomas would have
completely overruled Buckley v. Valeo, tossing aside the legal distinction
it had drawn between contributions and expenditures in favor of a
uniform strict-scrutiny standard.7 Writing for a four-justice plurality,
Chief Justice Roberts applied a “rigorous” review of the statute,
assessing whether it avoided “unnecessary abridgement” of an
individual’s First Amendment free-speech rights.8 He explained that the
plurality assumed, without deciding, that this intermediate level of
scrutiny applied because it neither changed the outcome nor required
overruling precedent.9 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that only the
government’s interest in the prevention of corruption, or the appearance

See infra Part III (explaining the harmful effects of money in politics).
See infra Part IV (considering the McCutcheon decision in the Court’s prior rulings).
4
See infra Part V (examining the future effects of the McCutcheon decision).
5
See infra Part VI (concluding the Article).
6
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (discussing the aggregate
contribution limits at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) and holding that aggregate limits on contributions
intrude on First Amendment rights).
7
See id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(“BCRA”) aggregate limits should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
8
Id. at 1444.
9
See id. at 1445–46 (concluding that the aggregate limit in place under Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA”) does not control); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2530 (2014) (“The [Supreme] Court does sometimes assume, without deciding, that a law is
subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny.”).
2
3
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thereof, could legitimately support a restriction on contribution limits.10
He then defined “corruption” solely as the direct exchange of money for
an official act.11 In articulating this definition, he affirmatively stated
that quid pro quo corruption does not encompass implicit exchanges of
influence and access for contributions.12 Given this definition, Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that aggregate limits could only be sustained if
they prevented circumvention of the individual base limits, which bar
individuals from directly contributing unlimited sums to specific
candidates, parties, and committees.13 Applying this stringent standard
and narrowed definition of corruption, Chief Justice Roberts found that
the aggregate contribution limits violated the First Amendment rights of
the plaintiff.14
B. Striking the Federal Aggregate Contribution Limits Allows the Wealthy to
Spend Even More Money to Influence Political Decisions
The federal aggregate contribution limits struck down in McCutcheon
had prohibited any one individual from donating in excess of $123,200
over a two-year period to all candidates for federal office, as well as
political action and party committees.15 For perspective, in 2012, the
median family income in the United States was $51,017.16 A typical
American family contributing its entire pre-tax income for two years
would still be incapable of reaching this limit.17 Even an individual with
an income of $191,156—a figure within the top five percent of income for
the country in 2012—and with no other expenses would struggle to
contribute the maximum amount after taxes.18
10
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (“The [Supreme] Court has identified only one
legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption
of the appearance of corruption.”).
11
See id. at 1441, 1450–51 (defining this exchange as “quid pro quo” corruption).
12
See id. at 1451 (referencing Justice Stevens’ statement “that [the Supreme Court] ha[s]
not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice”).
13
See id. at 1446 (noting that legislative additions and the introduction of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme strengthened statutory safeguards).
14
Id. at 1462.
15
Id. at 1442–43.
16
Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 (Sept. 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2013pubs/p60-245.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6MND-56M6.
17
See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Democracy We Left Behind in Greece and McCutcheon, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 117 (2014), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/
files/ pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89-112-torres-spelliscy_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
S7XG-XW74 [hereinafter The Democracy We Left Behind] (noting that the laws at issue in
McCutcheon only applied to the richest Americans).
18
Id.; Marge Baker, The McCutcheon Decision: Great for the Super-Rich, Bad for Everyone
Else, HUFF. POST: POLITICS (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
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Furthermore, in 2012, only 1219 individuals neared, reached, or
exceeded the aggregate limit reviewed in the Supreme Court’s
McCutcheon decision, which illuminated the rarefied air in which the
aggregate limits operate.19 These select individuals comprise fewer than
0.0004% of our country’s population.20 Yet, this miniscule number of
elite donors contributed more than $155.2 million to candidates, party
committees, and political action committees.21 It has been estimated that,
without the aggregate limit, these donors would have contributed at
least another $300 million, for a total of $459.3 million.22 This figure
dwarfs the $313 million that President Obama and Governor Romney
raised together from at least 3.7 million small donors during their 2012
presidential campaigns.23 Because of McCutcheon, those elite donors now
may lawfully contribute more than $3.5 million to each major party and
their candidates per election cycle.24 In total, the removal of the
aggregate limits is expected to result in an additional $1 billion in
campaign contributions over the next six years.25
Partly explaining the expected increase, candidates and parties have
a new vehicle with which to raise large amounts of funds—joint
fundraising committees.26 Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s skepticism that
marge-baker/the-mccutcheon-decision-g_b_5084787.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
5X74-9VRN.
19
See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Policy Brief: McCutcheon Money: The Projected Impact of
Striking Aggregate Contribution Limits, DEMOS 2 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/
default/files/publications/McCutcheonMoney-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
NN4D-9Y5F [hereinafter McCutcheon Money] (recognizing that a small group of donors
make substantial contributions to candidates, parties, and political action committees).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 1 (explaining the effects the decision in McCutcheon had on campaign
contributions).
25
McCutcheon Money, supra note 19, at 1; see Adam Bonica & Jenny Shen, The Rich Are
Dominating Campaigns. Here’s Why That’s About to Get Worse, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/23/the-rich-aredominating-campaigns-heres-why-thats-about-to-get-worse/, archived at http://perma.cc/
WQR5-JMA (predicting large growth in contributions post-McCutcheon based on rise in
contributions post-BCRA increase); Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New
Latitude to Give to Unlimited Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-political-donors-seize-on-newlatitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad
33_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9DL-SNS7 [hereinafter Wealthy Political
Donors] (“Together, 310 donors gave a combined $11.6 million more by this summer than
would have been allowed before the ruling.”).
26
See Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat: Case Should Super-Size Joint
Fundraising Committees, HUFF. POST:
POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2013, 2:28 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/mccutcheon-joint-fundraising-committees_
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candidates and parties would utilize joint fundraising committees to
solicit large donations, less than two weeks after the McCutcheon
decision, the Republican Party created a joint fundraising committee that
allowed donors to contribute more than $97,000 in one check, about
twenty percent more than the old limit.27 Just a few months later, several
Senate Republicans banded together to create another joint fundraising
committee that permits donors to contribute more than $150,000 in one
check.28 In addition, the increase is due to donors’ inability to use the
aggregate limit as an excuse to avoid contributing to officeholders’
campaigns when solicited.29 Already, there are reports of lobbyists
contributing much more than the former maximum of $123,200 as a
result of this pressure.30
As for other current practical effects of the decision, Chief Justice
Roberts and various commentators suggest that the silver lining of
McCutcheon is the possibility of money migrating from undisclosed or
less controlled channels back to the parties and other regulated political
committees that disclose the source of their political funds.31 However,
this hypothesis relies on the assumption that the rule change will merely

n_4057547.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C9L4-NXLU (using a chart to depict joint
fundraising committee growth between 1994–2012).
27
Paul Blumenthal, Republicans Launch First 'Super Committee' to Rake in PostMcCutcheon Money, HUFF. POST:
POLITICS (Apr. 11, 2014, 2:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/11/mccutcheon-gop_n_5134246.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/TXG8-TH39.
28
Byron Tau, GOP Launches New Big Money Effort, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:23 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/republicans-targeted-state-victory-fundraising109724.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AS5Y-BBB8 (“[R]epublicans are launching a
fundraising effort that will let donors cut six-figures checks to support GOP Senate
candidates.”).
29
See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Policy Brief, McCutcheon Methodology, DEMOS (2013),
http://www.demos.org/publication/mccutcheon-methodology,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/W52F-FPRD [hereinafter McCutcheon Methodology] (discussing data sets
of campaign contributions by elite donors).
30
Kate Ackley, Mini-Mega Donors Dominate Downtown Giving: K Street, ROLL CALL (July
29, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/k-street-files-mini-megadonors-dominate-downtown-giving/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/T2WZ-K3NF
(commenting that “elite mini-mega donors have blown” past the maximum contribution
limitation that the Supreme Court struck down in McCutcheon).
31
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (reasoning that with modern
technology disclosure will now offer an effective means of providing the voting public with
information); see also Nathanial Persily, Bringing Big Money out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-outof-the-shadows.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RSQ5-RH95 (asserting that because
the court “reaffirms the value of forcing disclosure of contributions to candidates[,]” it will
bring to light where the money is coming from and where it will go).
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shift the total amount spent—not increase it.32 First, this assumption is
probably weak because a group of donors—such as the lobbyists
described above—will contribute more because of their relationships
with individual candidates.33 Second, until certain avenues are shut
down, there presumably will be donors who continue to utilize channels
that allow them to keep their identities hidden from public view.34
Specific groups were purposely created to maintain donor secrecy and
advertise it as a selling point to their prospective funders.35 In addition,
some of these groups are part of networks that shift funds between
affiliated organizations to hide the source of the funds.36
III. WHY DOES ALLOWING THE USE OF MORE CONCENTRATED MONEY IN
POLITICS MATTER?
Part III explains why the expected influx of additional money into
politics will exacerbate democratic harms that already damage our
32
See David Weigel, The Supreme Court Just Struck a Blow to Individual Campaign Donation
Limits, and Conservatives Say It’ll Be Good for Transparency, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:54 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/04/02/the_supreme_court_just_gutted_indivi
dual_campaign_donation_limits_and_conservatives.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
82UN-GK2N (speculating it can be expected that more money will flow to candidates,
political action committees, and parties as a result of the McCutcheon decision).
33
See Ackley, supra note 30 (noting that “elite mini-mega” donors have blown past the
maximum contribution limitation that the Supreme Court struck down in McCutcheon); see
also Wealthy Political Donors, supra note 25 (“Together, 310 donors gave a combined $11.6
million more by this summer than would have been allowed before the ruling.”).
34
See Robert Maguire, Dark Money Hits $50 Million, Most Still to Come, OPEN SECRETS
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/08/dark-money-hits-50-millionmost-still-to-come/, archived at http://perma.cc/9QD-MXUN (explaining that the vast
majority of money that will be reported to the Federal Election Committee is still to come,
but given recent trends, dark money (anonymous) spending will be the highest it has ever
been).
35
See Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million
in 2012 Elections, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
koch-backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/
2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/XD43-XSMH [hereinafter Koch-Backed] (describing a coalition that was “constructed
with extensive legal barriers to shield its donors”); see also Brendan Fischer, Romney: An
"Investment" for the 1%?, PR WATCH (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.prwatch.
org/news/2012/09/11761/romney-and-investments-1, archived at http://perma.cc/
MM8A-9RBN (affirming that contributors to the Romney Campaign who “bundle” their
contributions can have their identities remain secret).
36
See Koch-Backed, supra note 35 (describing a coalition that was constructed with
extensive legal barriers to shield its donors, and further explaining that it is important to
donate without public disclosure to prevent personal attacks on donors); see also Fischer,
supra note 35 (affirming that contributors to the Romney Campaign who “bundle” their
contributions can have their identities remain secret and divulging that individuals
anonymously contributed to candidate by forming “sham” corporations).
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republic. It discusses how increasing large contributors’ ability to use
money in politics harms democratic self-government by permitting
legislative capture by a wealthy minority, which has distinct, self-serving
policy preferences. Additionally, Part III describes how increasing large
contributors’ ability to use money in politics leads to a crisis of
confidence in the integrity of our democracy and why this is a
constitutional concern.
A. Increasing Large Contributors’ Ability to Use Money in Politics Harms
Democratic Self-Government by Permitting Legislative Capture by a
Wealthy Minority
Campaign finance is intrinsically bound to the distribution of power
within a democracy.37 And, thus, campaign finance litigation ultimately
turns on fundamental theories of democracy and self-government.38 As
one scholar states: “Legal discourse on campaign finance reform often
moves quickly to fundamental discussions within political theory.
Positing some goal as the purpose of the First Amendment, both theorists
and litigants deduce the content and priority of various rights claims
according to their usefulness in advancing or respecting this goal.”39
But, at the highest levels of abstraction, both proponents and opponents
of campaign finance regulation describe their main concerns as being the
sovereignty of the people and the responsiveness of elected officials to
their constituents.40 For example, in McCutcheon, both Chief Justice
37
See Yasmin Dawood, Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court: Campaign Finance
Reform in Comparative Context, 4 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 269, 270 (2006) (“[C]onflicts over
campaign finance regulation are at base disputes about how power should be distributed
within a democracy.”).
38
Id.; see Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (2013) (explaining that because no court has defined corruption to
date, it “inescapably puts forward a conception of the proper role of a legislator in a
democracy”); Spencer Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3
ELECTION L.J. 305, 308 (2004) (“More than many other areas of the law, campaign finance
regulation is laden with questions about political theory, partisan interests, and complex
evidentiary records that involve political predictions.”); Lori Ringhand, Defining Democracy:
The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 77 (2004) (“Democratic
self-government can be defined and structured in many different ways.”).
39
Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 621 (2008).
40
See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Distinguishing "Genuine" from "Sham’ in
Grassroots Lobbying: Protecting the Right to Petition During Elections, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV.
353, 388–89 (2007) (“These incumbents are persons who have chosen to become (and seek
reelection as) the people's representatives in a system where the people are sovereign and
have guaranteed self-government rights of speech, association, and petition for the very
purpose of maintaining the accountability of those representatives.”); see also Mark C.
Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE
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Roberts and Justice Breyer identify these interests as animating their
opinions.41
However, the problem with the position of Chief Justice Roberts and
other opponents of campaign reform is that it ignores political reality.42
In a representative democracy, “[i]f it is the people who are sovereign,
then it is their preferences, . . . that should be reflected in the positions of
their representatives.”43 And there is a significant disjuncture between
the preferences of the majority and federal legislative outputs, which
instead reflect the policy preferences of the very wealthy—the group that
dominates campaign contributions.44 That majoritarian policy
L. REV. 767, 768 (2003) (commenting on this problem with campaign finance reform).
Professor Alexander states:
The states and federal government have responded to this problem
with campaign finance reform, in order to reduce the power of money
in politics, and to make candidates and elected officials more directly
responsive to the people. Campaign finance reform thus can protect
the republican form of government upon which the nation was
founded.
Id.
41
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). Chief Justice Roberts opines:
Representatives . . . can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive
to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of
self-governance through elected officials . . . . We have, however, held
that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of corruption . . . in
order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect of
restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall
govern them.
Id.; see id. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the government interests favoring
campaign finance regulations as “rooted in the constitutional effort to create a democracy
responsive to the people—a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas,
and sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects”).
42
See Eric Black, How Justice Roberts’ Campaign-Finance Ruling Ignores the Real World,
MINN. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2014/04/howjustice-roberts-campaign-finance-ruling-ignores-real-world, archived at http://perma.cc/
8RPV-8E9G (“Roberts’ description of the donor-candidate transactions the lead to millions
and millions of dollars in campaign contributions bears little relationship to what happens
in the real world in which well-heeled individuals and groups absolutely do buy
influence . . . ”).
43
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 320
(2014).
44
See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 13 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter AFFLUENCE AND
INFLUENCE] (“If the public . . . is reasonably competent in forming policy preferences, then
the failure of government policy to reflect those preferences . . . imply a failure of a
democratic governance.”); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POLS. 564, 573–74 (2014)
(reasoning that the wealthiest Americans exert more political influence then less fortunate
Americans); Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy
Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POLS. 51 (2013) (discussing what wealthy Americans seek from
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preferences are systematically frustrated suggests that the ability of the
wealthy to disproportionately influence government officials through
their financial domination of the electoral process has limited the extent
to which these officials remain responsive to the voting public.45 And
the social science demonstrating the control of the wealthy has led some
to raise the question of whether the United States is an oligarchy.46
Correspondingly, this anti-democratic capture of legislation
understandably leaves a large portion of the country feeling effectively
disenfranchised and cynical about the state of our democracy.47
1.

A Small Subset of Wealthy Individuals (the “Donor Class”) Already
Dominate Congressional Fundraising

It takes a lot of money to run for federal office. During the 2012
election cycle, candidates for the House of Representatives spent
$1,149,212,122 on their campaigns.48 Candidates for Senate spent

politics and how their policy preferences differ from other citizens); see also DAVID
CALLAHAN & J. MIJIN CHA, STACKED DECK: HOW THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS BY THE
AFFLUENT & BUSINESS UNDERMINES ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA, DEMOS 1,
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/StackedDeck2_1.pdf (last visited
Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YM7F-HXUU (providing evidence that the U.S.
political system is increasingly dominated by wealthy interests).
45
See AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 239 (explaining representational
inequality). See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of
All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 312–13 (1989) (explaining influence in
politics). Mr. Lowenstein concludes:
In summary, although it would be an overstatement to suggest that
economic interests always or nearly always contribute to influence
official conduct rather than to influence the outcome of elections, it is
probably correct to say that they usually follow this strategy, with the
possible and partial exception of labor unions.
Id.
46
See, e.g., Study: US is an Oligarchy, Not a Democracy, BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:09
PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/5PPJ-L656 (explaining that the U.S. is not a democracy).
47
See Liz Kennedy, Policy Brief: Stop the Next Citizens United: McCutcheon v. FEC and
the Crisis of Confidence in American Democracy, DEMOS 1–2, 5 (2013),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/McCutcheon-document.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/QM7-BD72 [hereinafter Next Citizens United] (stating that
Americans are outraged about the impact of money on the U.S. government); Liz Kennedy,
Policy Brief: Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming, Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate
Political Spending and Support for Common Sense Reform, DEMOS (2012), http://www.demos.
org/sites/default/files/publications/CitizensActuallyUnited_CorporatePoliticalSpending.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7Z2J-6WNF [hereinafter Citizens Actually United]
(“agreeing that there is too much corporate money in politics”).
48
BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE
OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS, DEMOS 3 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/
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$734,022,256.49 Individual contributions remain the primary source of
campaign funds for these candidates.50
Furthermore, large donations made by a very small group of
wealthy individuals, identified by Professor Overton as the “donor
class,” comprise the bulk of these individual contributions.51 For
example, less than 0.06% of the population provided more than 50% of
all individual contributions to candidates for Congress through
contributions of $1000 or more.52 And, while candidates have long relied
on large donors for campaign funding, the degree to which a tiny
fraction of the population dominates contributions and spending in
support of candidates has shot up in recent years.53 The Sunlight
Foundation reported that in the 2012 elections “candidates got more
money from a smaller percentage of the population than any year for
which [they] have data.”54
2.

The Donor Class Looks Different than the Country as a Whole and
Holds Different Policy Preferences

The donor class does not reflect the diversity of the country—its
members are disproportionately college-educated, white, male, fifty
years or older, and high-earning.55 These individuals tend to live in
small communities across the country.56 Most importantly, the donor
class has very different priorities than the average American, particularly
on economic issues.57 For example, over a quarter of the general public

default/files/publications/billion.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/V9X2-E5TK
[hereinafter BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY].
49
Id.
50
Id. at 12–13.
51
Id. at 8; see Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and
Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Donor Class] (discussing
the donor class).
52
BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY, supra note 48, at 13 (using a chart to depict large donor
dominance of congressional fundraising).
53
Id. at 4.
54
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1%, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (June 24, 2013, 9:00
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/, archived at
http://perma.cc/VNE9-AMDJ [hereinafter Political 1%].
55
Donor Class, supra note 51, at 102.
56
See Lee Drutman, The Political One Percent of the One Percent, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG
(Dec. 13, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/12/13/the-politicalone-percent-of-the-one-percent/, archived at http://perma.cc/5EMP-A3HP (“They tend to
cluster in a limited number of metropolitan zip codes, especially New York, Washington,
Chicago, and Los Angeles.”).
57
See Page et al., supra note 44, at 55 (discussing how the wealthy appear to differ
drastically from the general public regarding the nation’s priorities).
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said unemployment was the most important problem in early 2011.58
Only 11% of the wealthy agreed they were more concerned with the
deficit.59 Similarly, more than two-thirds of Americans believe that the
federal government should ensure that “everyone who wants to work
can find a job,” but less than a fifth of the donor class agreed.60
Additionally, almost eight out of ten Americans, including over 50% of
Republican voters, want the minimum wage to be high enough to keep a
family out of poverty, while only about four out of ten from the donor
class agree.61 The wealthy are also much more inclined than the general
public to favor spending cuts, particularly in social welfare programs,
over tax increases.62
a.

The Preferences of the Donor Class Drive Legislative Outputs, Leading to
Policies Skewed in Favor of the Already Privileged

A spate of research reports confirms the understanding that he who
pays the piper calls the tune.63 If the donor class wants something
different from working and middle-class voters, the donor class wins.64
For example, Princeton political scientist Martin Gilens finds that “the
American government does respond to the public’s preferences, but that
responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens.
Indeed, under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the
government does or doesn’t adopt.”65
His colleague, Professor Bartels, likewise finds that “affluent people
have considerable clout, while the preferences of the people in the
bottom third of the income distribution have no apparent impact on the
Lydia Saad, U.S. Subgroups Say Economy, Jobs Are Most Important Problem, GALLUP
(June 10, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148001/subgroups-say-economy-jobsimportant-problem.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/WTX2-DNU2 (citing results of
Gallup’s monthly Most Important Problems poll measured from January 2011 to May
2011).
59
See Page et al., supra note 44, at 55 (discussing that only 11% of wealthy respondents
felt that unemployment was the most important problem in the nation).
60
Id. at 57.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 56.
63
See ADAM LIOZ & BLAIR BOWIE, MILLION-DOLLAR MEGAPHONES: SUPER PACS AND
UNLIMITED OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS,
DEMOS (2012),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/MegaphonesMillionairesDemosUSPIRG.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VU47-RW9Y
(citing a report from the 2012 election campaign).
64
See id. (focusing on spending by outside non-candidate groups attempting to influence
elections).
65
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 1.
58
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behavior of their elected officials.”66 And, this year, Professor Gilens and
Professor Page released a new report that analyzed almost 1800 policy
outcomes over a twenty-year period, concluding “economic elites and
organized groups representing business interests have substantial
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based
interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent
influence.”67 The consequences of these differential impacts are vast.
Professor Gilens found that “political donations . . . but not voting or
volunteering, resembles the pattern of representational inequality,”
illuminating the strong link between large monetary contributions and
legislative outcomes.68
When the government is unresponsive to the public’s preferences for
how to structure the economy, and instead privileges the interests of the
already privileged, we see results like the real value of the minimum
wage declining, and then flat-lining, after 1968 while the effective tax
rate for millionaires has been falling since 1954.69 Despite support from a
majority of Americans across party lines, members of Congress have
refused to pass legislation that would help hard-working families move
above the poverty line.70 And yet, billionaire Warren Buffet famously
pays a lower tax rate than his secretary.71
Turning to the mechanics of this process, it appears that large
contributions enable donors to exert influence over politics and policymaking in several ways.72 First, the donor class can serve as a
gatekeeper.73 Because donors generally support candidates who share

LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 285 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
67
Gilens & Page, supra note 44, at 3.
68
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 239.
69
Callahan & Cha, supra note 44, at 12.
70
See id. at 13–14 (discussing the results of a poll that showed seventy-eight percent of
the general public supported increasing the minimum wage so that families did not fall
below poverty line).
71
See Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He's Still Paying Lower Tax Rate Than His Secretary, CNN
(Mar. 4, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/buffettsecretary-taxes/, archived at http://perma.cc/8T7R-YL7Y (noting that Warren Buffet’s
income is generated from investment gains rather than employment, which results in him
likely being the lowest paying taxpayer in his office).
72
See John Craig & David Madland, How Campaign Contributions and Lobbing Can Lead to
Inefficient
Economic
Policy,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROG.
(May
2,
2014),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2014/05/02/88917/howcampaign-contributions-and-lobbying-can-lead-to-inefficient-economic-policy/, archived at
https://perma.cc/69U8-NWDF (explaining that campaign contributions lead to inefficient
economic policy).
73
See Political 1%, supra note 54 (“[T]hese donors represent the 1% of the 1%, an elite
class that increasingly serves as the gatekeepers of public office in the United States.”).
66
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their views, there is a culling in the first instance in which political
viability of a candidate is not related to the depth of her experience or
the strength of his ideas.74 Given the need for robust fundraising to
succeed in competitive elections, the donor class can narrow the initial
field of viable candidates by offering or withholding support.75
Additionally, financial support is correlated with successful campaigns,
suggesting that candidates supported by the donor class will prevail
more often.76 The Sunlight Foundation looked at the top political donors
in 2012 and found:
Not a single member of the House or Senate elected that
year won without financial assistance from this group.
Money from the nation’s 31,385 biggest givers found its
way into the coffers of every successful congressional
candidate. And [84%] of those elected in 2012 took more
money from these 1% of the 1% donors than they did
from all of their small donors (individuals who gave
$200 or less) combined.77
Second, as Congressman John Sarbanes explains, “[d]riven by their
need to raise a lot of cash and to do it quickly, candidates forge a
dependency on this narrow class of funders.”78 A lobbyist commented
about the motivations of donors, saying, “[t]here is no question that
money creates the relationships[,] . . . [t]he large contributions enable
them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances they’ll be
successful with their public policy agenda.”79 The dependency of the
candidates on these elite funders can lead to candidates shifting their
positions or priorities even if they attempt to rationalize it away.80

See BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY, supra note 48, at 18 (noting that the wealthy play a
filtering role in the election process).
75
See Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: How the Supreme Court Helped Create the
Inequality Era and Why a New Jurisprudence Must Lead Us out, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1227,
1246–47 (2013) (addressing the political candidate’s need to align his political agenda with
large contributors to secure donations).
76
See id. at 1248, 1250 (discussing the role of money in elections).
77
Political 1%, supra note 54.
78
John P. Sarbanes & Raymond O'Mara III, Foreword, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 9 (2014).
79
DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 75 (2014), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-soft-money-WEB.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7HNN-S2LX.
80
See, e.g., Lioz, supra note 75, at 1246–47 (detailing a former congressional candidate’s
experience dialing for campaign dollars and finding that “there was definitely a shift in
emphasis” as to his positions).
74
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Illustrating this process, former Senator Kerrey discussed the operation
of large money on political decision-making as follows:
I make a decision to vote on one issue that’s different
than what I really—or I just don’t examine it any further.
I persuade myself that I’ve always been against raising
the minimum wage and people are contributing to me
because I’ve always been against raising the minimum
wage. But the fact is I’ve closed my mind off to any
thought of voting to raise the minimum wage because I
know it’s going to cut off a significant amount of
financial support if I do. That’s what I’m saying. I say
it’s corrupting as an impact upon what you’re willing to
at least consider as the possible right course of action.81
Other former members of Congress have been even blunter, former
Senator Simpson said, “[t]oo often, Members' first thought is not what is
right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising.”82
Further illustrating the improper influence of the wealthy elite on the
legislative agenda, Professor Tokaji and Renata Strause of Ohio State’s
Moritz College of Law recently released a report that examined the realworld impact of this new unlimited political spending and found that
“[i]ndependent expenditures drove the agenda.”83 They quote Senator
Nelson saying that some outside spenders have “‘unhealthy
expectations’ of the elected officials they assist.”84
One former
Representative put it this way, “So is the risk there? Obviously. Are
there going to be people that are influenced in a way that they might not
otherwise be? Obviously.”85 And, as Senator Conrad said of big
spenders, “they’re going to have somebody’s ear.”86
Third, and perhaps most importantly, even if our elected
representatives are not just concerned about raising funds for reelection,
it matters who they are hearing from and listening to.87 They hear much

TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 79, at 78–79.
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003).
83
TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 79, at 61.
84
Id. at 76.
85
Id. at 79.
86
Id.
87
See Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising
Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFF. POST:
POLITICS (Jan. 8, 2013, 7:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_242
7291.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P9PH-4Y94 (discussing the time members of
Congress spend on the telephone fundraising compared to doing Congressional work).
81
82
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more from some interests than others.88 It is estimated that elected
officials spend between four and six hours per day fundraising, which
generally means calling people making at least a half million dollars.89
Senator Murphy explains:
I talked a lot more about carried interest inside that call
room than I did in the supermarket. . . . They have
fundamentally
different
problems
than
other
people . . . [a]nd in Connecticut especially, you spend a
lot of time on the phone with people who work in the
financial markets. And so you’re hearing a lot about
problems that bankers have not a lot of problems that
people who work at the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have.
You certainly have to stop and check yourself.90
Moreover, large contributors are more likely to be granted special
access to elected officials.91 For example, large donors might be invited
to attend special fundraising events with the candidates.92 Outside of
special events, two researchers from Yale and the University of
California conducted a field experiment that showed how members of
Congress and their staff made themselves much more available to
The
contributors than to non-contributing voting constituents.93
researchers requested meetings with 191 members of Congress,
identifying themselves as contributors or constituents.94 Almost 20% of
the contributor requests resulted in a meeting with the legislator or a
senior staff member compared with just 5% of the constituent requests.95
Id.
See Paul Blumenthal, Chris Murphy: ‘Soul-Crushing’ Fundraising is Bad for Congress,
HUFF. POST: POLITICS (May 7, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/
07/chris-murphy-frundraising_n_3232143.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XRA9-6K9W
[hereinafter Chris Murphy] (describing typical income levels of donors that Senator Murphy
regularly calls); Grim & Siddiqui, supra note 87 (discussing the time members of Congress
must spend on the telephone fundraising compared to doing Congressional work).
90
Chris Murphy, supra note 89.
91
See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access to
Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Experiment
(2014), http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~broockma/kalla_broockman_donor_access_field_
experiment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A8T4-6UU3 (discussing the preferential
treatment large donors to political campaigns receive).
92
See Donor Class, supra note 51, at 102 (noting the special access to politicians donors
receive).
93
See Kalla & Broockman, supra note 91 (describing the author’s field experiment for the
purpose of assessing the effects donations have upon legislative behavior).
94
Id. at 9–10.
95
See id. at 16 (citing results from the level of access gained in constituent and revealed
donor conditions).
88
89
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The very wealthy have even more access with 40% of wealthy poll
respondents reporting at least one contact with their senator over a sixmonth span.96 And the McCutcheon decision has exacerbated this. One
donor who has given over $175,000 more than the former aggregate limit
said, “[y]ou have to realize, when you start contributing to all these
guys, they give you access to meet them and talk about your issues.”97
b.

Increasing Large Contributors’ Ability to Use Money in Politics Leads to a
Crisis of Confidence in the Integrity of Our Democracy—A Constitutional
Concern

In the seminal modern campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court acknowledged that “Congress could legitimately conclude that the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if
confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent.’”98 In other words, when people believe
the government is corrupt, they lose confidence in our democracy.99
This loss of faith is a real concern. Over 80% of Americans, with
significant bi-partisan majorities, disagree with Chief Justice Roberts’
view that only quid pro quo corruption—basically, bribery—constitutes
Rather, Americans know that
corruption of government.100
when financial supporters have more access and influence with members
of Congress than regular Americans, that also is a corruption of
Even before McCutcheon, Americans
democratic government.101
overwhelmingly
recognized
how
our
government’s
elected
representatives are more responsive to the small group of people that

Page et al., supra note 44, at 54–55.
Wealthy Political Donors, supra note 25.
98
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
99
See ROBERT POST, MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS 18 (M. Youn, ed.
2011) (“[T]he growing fear that our elections are increasingly failing to fulfill their
democratic task, and that as a consequence the successful legitimation of our constitutional
government may be slipping from our grasp.”).
100
Citizens Actually United, supra note 47.
101
See id. (concluding that “[85%] of Americans call it corruption when financial
supporters have more access and influence with members of Congress than average
Americans, [57%] say it is very corrupt.”); see also Thomas B. Edsall, The Value of Political
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/
thomas-edsall-the-value-of-political-corruption.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/
BL7G-9EVC (“From 2006 to 2013, the percentage of Americans convinced that corruption
was ‘widespread throughout the government in this country’ grew from [59%] to [79%],
according to Gallup.”).
96
97
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make large campaign contributions.102 The public understands how
these concerns are tied to contribution limits, disagreeing directly with
the Court’s decision in McCutcheon.103 A recent poll showed that a strong
majority of Americans support aggregate contribution limits and a
plurality believe that such limits reduce corruption.104
These concerns about corruption within politics have measurable
results that call into question the functioning of our democracy. In the
past year, Americans’ “confidence in Congress [was] not only the lowest

102
Memorandum from Celinda Lake, David Mermin & John Norris, Lake Research
Partners and Brian Nienaber & Ashlee Rich, The Terrance Group to Interested Parties 2
(Feb.
2009),
https://www.mainecleanelections.org/sites/default/files/polling/2009_
Polling_Memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S625-N9SH (describing the results of a
bipartisan poll, which reported that voters supported providing limited public funding of
qualified candidates if they agreed to decline large contributions in an attempt to address
big money and lobbyist concerns); A Look at H.R. 1826, and the Public Financing of
Congressional Campaigns: Hearing Before the Comm. on House Admin. H.R., 111th Cong.
2 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52711/html/CHRG111hhrg52711.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/3M6B-4PUY (statement of Arn H. Pearson,
Vice President for Programs, Common Cause) (discussing voter concerns that large
campaign contributions prevent Congress from dealing with issues facing the nations);
Sarah Dutton et al., Americans' View of Congress: Throw 'Em out, CBS NEWS (May 21, 2014,
6:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-view-of-congress-throw-em-out/,
archived at http://perma.cc/6REP-BFCB (“Three in four think wealthy Americans have a
better chance than others of influencing the election process. Only [23%] say all Americans
have an equal chance to do so.”); see also Edsall, supra note 101 (noting the public’s belief in
growing corruption). Mr. Edsall states:
Over the period from 1964 to 2012, the percentage of voters who said
that government was “run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves more than doubled, from [29%] to [79%], while the share of
the electorate that believed government was run for the benefit of all
the people” fell from [64%] to [19%], according to American National
Election Studies and data supplied to me by Alan Abramowitz, a
political scientist at Emory.
Id.; Victoria S. Shabo, "Money, Like Water . . .": Revisiting Equality in Campaign Finance
Regulation After the 2004 "Summer of 527s", 84 N.C. L. REV. 221, 252 (2005) (describing
findings of public opinion researchers showing that “Americans overwhelmingly believe
that political contributions tinge the policymaking process”).
103
See A Blistering Dissent in ‘McCutcheon’: Conservatives Substituted Opinion for Fact,
MOYERS & CO. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/04/02/a-blistering-dissent-inmccutcheon-conservatives-substituted-opinion-for-fact/, archived at http://perma.cc/
9AZF-BFZJ (discussing the Court’s four-member dissent).
104
See Corruption Effects of Donation Limits—Individual Candidates, YOUGOV (Apr. 2014),
http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/vjq77o8ddf/tabs_Combined_camp
aign_finance_20140404.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M6R4-M74F (reporting polling
results regarding corruption and campaign donations). See generally David M. Primo &
Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5
ELECTION L.J. 23, 26 (June 2005) (finding little impact but acknowledging that they found
“some evidence that public disclosure and restrictions on contributions from organizations
improve perceived political efficacy . . . ”).
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on record [with only 7% expressing a great deal or a lot of confidence in
the legislature], but also the lowest Gallup has recorded for any
institution in the [forty-one]-year trend.”105 This alienation is driving a
significant portion of the public away from political engagement.106 One
poll showed that almost two-thirds of Americans, and almost the same
percentage of Republicans and Democrats, trust the government less
because big donors, in this case Super PACs, have more influence than
regular voters.107 When faced with unlimited spending from Super
PACs, a quarter of Americans said they are less likely to vote, and four in
ten Americans believe their votes don’t matter very much, because big
donors have “so much more influence over elected officials than average
Americans.”108 Even in 2008, an election with record turnout, eighty
million eligible voters failed to participate; when eligible voters who said
they were unlikely to vote were asked why they did not pay attention to
politics, a majority of them answered “[it is so] corrupt.”109
IV. WHAT DOES THE ROBERTS COURT GET WRONG IN ITS MONEY IN
POLITICS JURISPRUDENCE?
The preceding discussion focused on the granular holding of the
McCutcheon plurality decision, the political realities of money in politics,
and its impact on democratic self-governance.110 But it is also important
to look at the place of McCutcheon within the arc of the Roberts Court’s
deregulatory project.111 This section looks at the larger context of
constitutional doctrine and developments in money in politics
jurisprudence.112 This section first considers McCutcheon’s place in the
Court’s prior jurisprudence in this area, noting its inconsistency with the
direct precedent of Buckley and other cases that defined the term
“corruption.” It then discusses the failure of the McCutcheon plurality to
Rebecca Riffkin, Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP (June 19,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits-historic
-low.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9ZXZ-HQEQ.
106
See Citizens Actually United, supra note 47 (explaining that Americans know financial
supporters improperly influence politics).
107
National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2
(Apr.
2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-super-pacscorruption-and-democracy, archived at http://perma.cc/F35R-BTWB.
108
Id. at 3.
109
Susan Page et al., Why 90 Million Americans Won’t Vote in November, USA TODAY (Aug.
15, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-0815/non-voters-obama-romney/57055184/1, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZP8-X47J.
110
See infra Part IV (discussing the plurality decision in McCutcheon).
111
See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (recognizing stare decisis).
112
See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the McCutcheon decision failed to consider
important democratic values).
105

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/11

Kennedy and Katsuya Endo: The World According to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It

2015]

McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters

551

consider important democratic values other than corruption that are
inextricably bound in the First Amendment and the Constitution. Next,
it shows how the McCutcheon plurality’s approach is not applied
consistently. And it concludes by explaining how Chief Justice Roberts
has shifted the campaign finance analytical framework, privileging the
right of the powerful to use their resources to influence policy-making
over the right of the public to participate meaningfully.
A. The McCutcheon Plurality Rejected a Significant Portion of the Court’s
Earlier Case Law on Aggregate Limits and the Governmental Interest in
Preventing Corruption
1.

The McCutcheon Plurality Effectively Overturned the Direct
Precedent of Buckley

In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the aggregate contribution
limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).113 However, the
McCutcheon decision invalidates these limits by directly rejecting a type
of contribution limit upheld in Buckley.114 Chief Justice Roberts contends
the holding in Buckley is ripe for plenary reexamination because the
aggregate contribution limits challenged in McCutcheon operated within
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) regime.115 BCRA added
several additional anti-circumvention measures to the original FECA
scheme under which the aggregate limits were reviewed in Buckley, and
there were less restrictive means of preventing circumvention of the base
limits.116 Consequently, as discussed below, these are not good reasons
for treating Buckley as not controlling.117
While it is true that BCRA created a new regulatory regime, or at
least, a new overlay, this is true of every provision upheld, or
But the McCutcheon plurality did not
invalidated, in Buckley.118
invalidate all of the holdings in Buckley, despite Justice Thomas’
concurrence advocating that step.119 Thus, it is unclear how the existence

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976).
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
115
Richard Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits
in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 855, 886 (2005).
116
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446.
117
See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining why Buckley should be viewed as controlling).
118
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 286–94 (citing to the concurring and dissenting opinions).
119
Compare McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (acknowledging continued vitality of the
contribution/expenditure divide and base limits), with id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(calling for overruling of Buckley).
113
114
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of BCRA alone allowed the Court to disregard Buckley’s upholding of the
aggregate limits in FECA.120
Additionally, Justice Breyer’s dissent pointed out the holes in Chief
Justice Roberts’ reliance on supposedly new alternative ways of
preventing circumvention of the base limits as a reason for
distinguishing Buckley.121 He explained:
For the most part, the alternatives the plurality mentions
were similarly available at the time of Buckley. Their
hypothetical presence did not prevent the Court from
upholding aggregate limits in 1976. How can their
continued hypothetical presence lead the plurality now
to conclude that aggregate limits are “poorly tailored?”
How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the
Court to overrule Buckley now?122
The foundational principle of stare decisis, absent special justification,
requires adherence to precedent to ensure that decisions are “‘founded in
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.’”123 The factual
changes Chief Justice Roberts described appear fairly minor. And the
principle of stare decisis is given extra force when overturning a
precedent would disrupt settled state statutes.124 As Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledged, eight states had laws setting aggregate
Moreover, even if Buckley should not be
contribution limits.125
considered inviolable and might be distinguishable from the issues
presented in McCutcheon, a more robust application of the stare decisis
doctrine would have enhanced the public’s confidence that the radical
jurisprudential shift in McCutcheon was not just a product of the
individual jurists’ agendas.126
120
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (analyzing the Court’s reasoning for rejecting
Buckley) (citations omitted).
121
Id. at 1479 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122
Id.
123
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2651 (2014) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
265 (1986)).
124
Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
125
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 n.7 (listing Connecticut, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as states that impose
base limits on contributions).
126
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 414 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing the lack of respect to precedent paid by the justices joining
the majority opinion). “In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell comes
down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results. Virtually every one of its
arguments was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority opinion is essentially an
amalgamation of resuscitated dissents.” Id.
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The McCutcheon Plurality Radically Reconceives the Bulk of Its
Precedent Defining Corruption

As Justice Breyer discussed in his dissent in McCutcheon, by holding
that the only legitimate government interests sufficient to uphold
contributions limits are the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the
appearance thereof, Chief Justice Roberts completely disregards the
animating rationale in McConnell and the more expansive understanding
of corruption discussed in other Supreme Court cases.127 In McConnell,
the Court upheld BCRA’s ban on soft money precisely because it
recognized the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance thereof extended to the risk that large donors would be able
to exercise undue influence on the legislative process.128 The McConnell
Court found that corruption of government is “not confined to bribery of
public officials, but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”129 The possibility that
legislators will “decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their
constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder” is a more subtle
form of corruption than straight quid pro quo transactions, but is “equally
As the Court in McConnell put it, “[m]ore
[as] dispiriting.”130
importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases
have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence
on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’”131
The McConnell Court was right. Going as far back as Buckley, the
Court has acknowledged that contribution limits are constitutional
because they function to prevent “the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent
in a regime of large individual financial contributions”132 Similar
understandings of the type of corruption that was a sufficient
government concern to permit campaign finance limits were advanced in
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, FEC v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469–71.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 153.
131
Id. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441
(2001)).
132
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
127
128
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Government PAC, and FEC v. Beaumont.133 In Nixon, the Court most
explicitly stated that improper influence went beyond quid pro quo
corruption:
In speaking of “improper influence” and “opportunities
for abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,”
we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors. These were the obvious points behind our
recognition that the Congress could constitutionally
address the power of money “to influence governmental
action” in ways less “blatant and specific” than
bribery.134
Additionally, members of the Nixon Court recognized the importance of
campaign finance rules, finding that “by limiting the size of the largest
contributions, such restrictions aim to democratize the influence that
money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process.”135
However, in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts did not truly wrestle
with these statements, merely noting that “[i]t is fair to say . . . ‘that we
have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent
voice.’”136 Instead, he transforms dicta from Citizens United v. FEC and
non-binding language from a partial concurrence in McConnell into
binding precedent.137 To understand this dubious alchemy, we need to
understand the holdings of Citizens United and McConnell, as well as
distinguish the holdings of those cases from the dicta and from Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon.138
133
See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (discussing campaign contribution
corruption and the need for limits); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441
(defining corruption in the campaign finance system and the need for limits); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000) (discussing corruptive influence and the
need for campaign finance limits); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (defining corruption as “a subversion of the political process” in which
“[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns”).
134
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389.
135
Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
137
Id.
138
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (citing Justice Kennedy’s holding); McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 363 (2003) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
BCRA); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (concluding that the aggregate limits on contribution
intrude on citizen’s First Amendment rights).
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In Citizens United and McConnell, Justice Kennedy expressed his
belief that ingratiation and access are not corruption.139 But Justice
Kennedy did not author the controlling decision in McConnell, which, as
noted above, upheld BCRA’s ban on soft money because of concerns
about ingratiation and access.140 Also, in Citizens United, this definition
of corruption was not necessary to the disposition of the case, which
focused on the independence of the expenditures and whether a
prohibition on the same could turn on the corporate identity of the
speaker.141 Moreover, as noted by Justice Breyer, the broad “holding” of
Citizens United assumed by Chief Justice Roberts would have overruled
McConnell—a result that was not contemplated in either the Citizens
United majority or dissenting opinions.142 But, in McCutcheon, Chief
Justice Roberts primarily cites to Citizens United when holding that only
the government’s interests in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the
appearance thereof can support contribution limits.143 Even worse, Chief
Justice Roberts does not even do the courtesy of also importing Justice
Kennedy’s caveat that “[i]f elected officials succumb to improper
influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there
is cause for concern.”144 Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts’ holding in
McCutcheon extends the dicta of Citizens United and marks a radical new
rule that is detached from real-world evidence and concerns.145
139
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not
corruption . . . [t]he appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”).
140
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)) (“More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too
narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends
beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’”).
141
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Richard L. Hasen,
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 213 (2012) (“Of these cases,
the most important one is Citizens United v. FEC, in which the Court endorsed in dicta a
very stingy definition of corruption that excludes ingratiation and the sale of access, and
rejected the idea that political equality could justify regulations limiting political speech.”).
142
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143
Id. at 1441–42.
144
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
145
Professor Zephyr Teachout offers an even deeper critique of Chief Justice Roberts’
devotion to the term quid pro quo corruption, arguing that it does not have a robust
doctrinal history as used by Chief Justice Roberts and that its application in criminal
bribery law, to the extent that states and the federal government even require its presence,
stems from due process concerns related to criminal punishment, not an underlying
constitutional definition of the term “corruption.” See Zephyr Teachout, What John Roberts
Doesn’t Get About Corruption, POLITICO (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
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B. The McCutcheon Plurality Failed to Consider Important Democratic
Values Other Than Corruption That Are Inextricably Bound in the First
Amendment and the Constitution
As seen by Chief Justice Roberts’ invocation of Burke and Justice
Breyer’s reference to Rousseau, almost all of the justices in McCutcheon
signed on to opinions that implicitly acknowledge that the First
Amendment raises questions about the nature of democracy.146 This
suggests that the First Amendment must be interpreted to serve
democratic ends and also reveals disagreement about the underlying
vision of democracy embodied by the Constitution.147
Justice Breyer explained that the narrow conception of corruption
endorsed by Chief Justice Roberts creates a world in which large
contributions can “break[] the constitutionally necessary ‘chain of
communication’ between the people and their representatives” because
“[w]here enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be
heard.”148 Justice Breyer reasoned that, once this occurs, the “free
marketplace of political ideas loses its point.”149 Justice Breyer makes the
magazine/story/2014/04/what-john-roberts-doesnt-get-about-corruption-105683.html#.V
B29E_IdWH9, archived at http://perma.cc/WQZX-XPAV (criticizing Chief Justice Roberts’
definition of corruption); see also Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
59, 94 (2013) (suggesting that the Court, despite its ostensible fact-finding in Citizens United,
actually established a bright-line legal rule expressing the Court’s general world view);
Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 360–61 (2014). Spencer and Wood
state:
[T]he Court admitted that it did not care whether independent
expenditures actually corrupt the political process because, in the
Court's eyes, independent expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of
law, any evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. We strongly
disagree with the Court's reliance on this legal fiction; it is the bluntest
of all possible instruments for judging regulations of the political
process.
Id.
146
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461–62; id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Hellman, supra
note 38, at 1402 (arguing that any conception of corruption must draw from views of what
constitutes a healthy democracy and the appropriate role of legislators and members of the
polity).
147
See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 57–70 (1948) (discussing American individualism and the Constitution).
148
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘A fundamental principle of
our constitutional system’ is the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.’”); see
also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(1998) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s privileging of political speech does not fit
within the usual framework that does not look at the content of the speech at issue unless a
primary concern of the First Amendment is ensuring democratic accountability).
149
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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connection, explaining, “[s]peech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
political communication seeks to secure government action.”150 He
further stated that when “[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary
to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns,” the integrity of
the electoral process is threatened.151 Thus, Justice Breyer advances a
view of the First Amendment, which would seek to ensure that a few
voices cannot shout over everybody else, writing, “the First Amendment
advances not only the individual’s right to engage in political speech, but
also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
collective speech matters.”152 Justice Breyer’s concerns seem particularly
well founded given the findings of Professor Gilens and Professor
Bartels that were discussed above and presented to the Court in Demos’
amicus brief.153
Many scholars also have discussed other democratic values that are
present within the First Amendment.154 For example, Judge J. Skelly
Wright argued that the First Amendment contains an element of political
equality.155 In addition, Professor Alexander has suggested that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting the time of
candidates and elected officials, letting them focus on governing instead

Id.
Id. at 1468 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985)) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); ROBERT
POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 7–16, 80–94
(2014)).
152
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally David Cole, First
Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
236, 252–71 (1991) (discussing corporate campaign spending and its impact).
153
See generally Brief for Appellee at 1–41, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No.
12-536) (citing to findings found in this particular case).
154
See Sheri J. Engelken, Majoritarian Democracy in a Federalist System: The Late Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the First Amendment, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 695, 697–98 (2007)
(using Justice Rehnquist as an example of another scholar that discussed democratic values
within the First Amendment).
155
J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625–31 (1982); see Jessica A. Levinson, The Original
Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 911
(2013) (“Had the Court properly characterized political equality as an ideal which
promotes, rather than harms, First Amendment interests, then the Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence would be markedly different.”).
150
151
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of raising money.156 Furthermore, Professor Overton and others have
advanced the value of participation.157
To the extent that Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges the
contribution limits present a question about democracy, he errs by
ignoring any value other than a narrow conception of corruption.158 In
particular, his disregard for the social science showing the domination of
the political process by the wealthy elite reveals a mistaken underlying
world view that campaign finance laws, such as the aggregate
contribution limits at issue, adulterate “natural” democratic processes by
redistributing or otherwise regulating resources that can be used to
engage in or amplify political speech.159 Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis
assumes that the world without campaign finance laws has a more
legitimate and government-neutral condition.160 Accordingly, Chief

156
Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government Interest in
Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 687–89 (2006);
see Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and
Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 534 (2011).
157
See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1277 (2012)
[hereinafter The Participation Interest] (discussing how the Supreme Court cited
participation as a justification for upholding campaign finance limits); see also Gregory P.
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of
Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185,
206 (2007) (addressing the challenges of campaign finance and the effect of monetary
participation); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality,
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2498 (2003) (describing the two main claims about
political participation and the First Amendment).
158
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014).
159
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes down Overall Political Donation Cap, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supremecourt-ruling-on-campaign-contributions.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RD7EPJV8 (“Chief Justice Roberts said that brief passage on overall limits had to be reconsidered
in light of regulatory developments and other factors.”).
160
See Ellen D. Katz, Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 698 (2014)
(arguing that the Roberts court is skeptical of electoral regulations that effect political
participation); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259–60 (1992)
(arguing that First Amendment absolutists view the government as “the enemy of freedom
of speech” and that “an effort to regulate speech is defined as a governmental attempt to
interfere with communicative processes, taking the existing distribution of entitlements—
property rights, wealth, and so on—as a given”); Kuhner’s Book Explores Death of Campaign
Finance Reform, GSU L. (Jul. 3, 2013), http://law.gsu.edu/2014/07/03/kuhners-new-bookexplores-death-campaign-finance-reform/, archived at http://perma.cc/GZ72-AAFL
(“‘Blame it on the Supreme Court,’ Kuhner says. ‘No other court in the world today
justifies plutocracy. State and federal legislatures have acted countless times to restore
democratic integrity and a minimum degree of political equality, but the Supreme Court
considers civic values a threat to its free-market Constitution.’”).
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Justice Roberts views campaign finance laws with active doubt and
hostility.161
The fullest expression of this bias can be seen in a case in which
Chief Justice Roberts authored an opinion striking down part of an
Arizona statute that provided additional matching funds to candidates
whose competitors were particularly well-funded; a holding that relies
on the proposition that “the prospect of more speech—responsive
speech, competitive speech, the kind of speech that drives public
debate—counts as a constitutional injury.”162 Several scholars and
political commentators have analogized this stance to that of the Lochner
Court, which aggressively struck down state wage-and-hour labor
protections as violations of employees’ supposed liberty rights, while
ignoring the realities of the power dynamics at issue.163
In addition to ignoring the actual distribution of political power,
Chief Justice Roberts disregards the government’s role in creating the
ostensibly neutral power dynamics in the first place.164 For example,
161
See Katz, supra note 160, at 698 (viewing the Roberts Court as skeptical of electoral
regulation). This hostility and skepticism is particularly odd when contrasted with the
deference the Roberts majority gives states’ claims of electoral integrity in support of their
voter identification laws, which actually exclude voters. See also Joshua A. Douglas,
(Mis)Trusting the States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405396, archived at
http://perma.cc/B7FS-95AE (stating the Supreme Court’s skepticism of federal campaign
finance regulations).
162
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2837 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
163
Id.; see TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE
FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 55–59 (2014) (comparing the Lochner Court decisions with
Buckley); Karena Rahall, The Siren Is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward
Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 654 (2014) (discussing the view
many people have of the Lochner Court as being unconcerned with the difficulties faced by
workers); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1987)
[hereinafter Lochner’s Legacy] (discussing Lochner and its subsequent effects); David H.
Gans, The Roberts Court Thinks Corporations Have More Rights Than You Do: The Chief Justice
Continues His First Amendment Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC (June 30, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118493/john-roberts-first-amendment-revolutioncorporations, archived at http://perma.cc/US25-UHQT (discussing how the Lochner Court
struck down laws designed to prevent the exploitation of workers); William Greider,
Thanks to the Roberts Court, Corporations Have More Constitutional Rights Than Actual People,
THE NATION (May 20, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/179932/thanksroberts-court-corporations-have-more-constitutional-rights-actual-people,
archived
at
http://perma.cc//A4XN-59XE (analogizing the Lochner Court era and its constitutional
obstacles to progressive legislation to Chief Justice Roberts and his precedent smashing
decisions).
164
See Thomas B. Edsall, Supreme Injustice, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/opinion/edsall-supreme-injustice.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/5J9D-535R (“[T]he court has shown more concern for the First
Amendment rights of wealthy donors than for the voting rights of minorities[,] . . . [t]he
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income that derives from accrued wealth often is taxed at a lower rate
than earned income—a policy that solidifies the privileged place of the
already rich, while burdening those who are still working to accrue
Historically, African Americans were
income-producing assets.165
denied access to wealth-building government programs, such as
federally supported mortgages that encouraged home ownership and
asset accumulation.166 This is just one example of how segregation and
discrimination in education, employment, housing, health care, criminal
justice administration, and many other areas have created disparities in
wealth and economic power. These examples illustrate the ways in
which government policies may benefit or disadvantage certain
segments of the population, which can lead to differences in wealth—a
difference that the Court has acknowledged can result in an individual’s
ability to “speak more.”167
Government policies are also the reason that more money can
translate into more “speech.”168 A myriad of government policies work
together to create the structure that privileges wealth in the marketplace
of politics and ideas.169 For example, the size of the House of
Representatives was fixed at 435 in the early part of the twentieth
century.170 Constituencies have grown from about 30,000 in 1790 to
about 700,000 in 2010, making the United States an outlier amongst the

Supreme Court has made clear that it will judge attempts to restrict the monetary kind of
‘participation’ very strictly[.]’”).
165
See Beverly I. Moran, Capitalism and the Tax System: A Search for Social Justice, 61 SMU
L. REV. 337, 373 (2008) (proposing a new tax system idea which incorporates capitalism
visions).
166
See Reginald L. Robinson, Poverty, the Underclass, and the Role of Race Consciousness: A
New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377,
1377, 1405–06 (2001) (critiquing MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995) and
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)).
167
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).
168
See R. Sam Garrett, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues
for Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. (June 23, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41542.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CT3J-BLTT (citing McComish v. Bennett as an
example where Chief Justice Roberts held that the “unconstitutionally burdened privately
financed candidates’ free speech . . . did not meet a compelling state interest”).
169
See id. (giving examples of cases through the years that formed the United States’
campaign finance policies).
170
Richard Edward McLawhorn Jr., Apportionment or Size? Why the U.S. House of
Representatives Should Be Expanded, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2011).
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lower houses of developed democracies.171 Larger districts tend to have
representatives who are less accessible to the general public, highlighting
the value of contact that can be obtained through large contributions.172
Additionally, the prevalence of large districts means mass media
communications are a virtual requirement to reach the electorate.173 But
use of the airwaves is not free.174 Instead, the federal government sells
spectrum licenses to broadcasters, creating the property rights that
contribute to the costs of using television or radio to engage in political
discourse.175 These examples demonstrate that there is no governmentneutral baseline democratic condition that will be restored if only
somebody would rid us of these troublesome campaign finance laws
(although that has not stopped Chief Justice Roberts from trying).
Once the aggregate contribution limits were understood to present
questions of democracy, Chief Justice Roberts should have considered
democratic values other than quid pro quo corruption bound in the
Constitution and our structure of government.176 In addition to those
noted above, a host of prominent scholars have laid out a number of
compelling democratic values and theories of government interest
rooted in the Constitution that should be embedded in our campaign
finance jurisprudence, including: (1) majoritarian alignment; (2) antidomination; (3) anti-oligarchy; (4) dependence corruption; (5) equality;
(6) participation; and (7) structural corruption.177 It is not within the
171
Amber Wichowsky, District Size Matters: The Representational Costs of Too Many
Constituents, 9 ELECTION L.J. 231, 231 (2010) (reviewing BRIAN FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL
REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS: THE CASE FOR INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2010)).
172
See id. at 232 (“House members representing larger constituents ‘have a more difficult
time meeting the policy and service demands of the citizens in their districts.’”); Byron J.
Harden, House of the Rising Population: The Case for Eliminating the 435-Member Limit on the
U.S. House of Representatives, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 73, 93 (2011) (discussing the rising
population within the U.S. House of Representatives and eliminating the member number
limit); Christopher M. Straw, The Role of Electoral Accountability in the Madisonian Machine, 11
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 355 (2008) (addressing the political ideals of federal
government brought forth by James Madison).
173
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting individual
contributions were constitutional and did not violate the First Amendment).
174
Julian Hattem, Broadcasters: Airwave Auction Contains Message for FCC, THE HILL (Dec.
11, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/226878-broadcasters-airwaveauction-contains-message-for-fcc, archived at http://perma.cc/992N-ZF9H.
175
See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 272 (evaluating the current system of free speech and
expression).
176
See DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 47–50 (2014)
(describing the different values under the theory of democracy).
177
See Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy,
96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1416 (2008) (proposing the antidomination model that deals with judicial
oversight of democratic politics); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
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purview of this Article to fully consider and analyze these bases for more
effective government action to cabin the influence of money on our
democratic self-government, it is instead the job of the Court.
Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudence on money in politics will never
be well grounded until it expressly grapples with and fully articulates
the theory of democracy that underlies its interpretation of the
Constitution.
C. The McCutcheon Plurality’s Approach is Not Applied Consistently
The Roberts Court approach might be more easily explained if Chief
Justice Roberts were simply a First Amendment absolutist who hews
literally to the notion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”178 In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts attempts to
cast himself in this light.179 But, as Professor Teachout pointed out,
outside of the campaign finance realm, Chief Justice Roberts willingly
engages in a First Amendment analysis that carefully balances the realworld harms of certain expressive conduct with the importance of
ensuring freedom of speech.180 In McCutcheon, however, Chief Justice
Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 670 (2014) (addressing the principles of oligarchy and class
inequality); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1994) (arguing for constitutional law to require
equal-dollars-per-voter); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand
"Corruption" to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (claiming that an institution can be corrupt
regardless of whether or not its members are corrupt); The Participation Interest, supra note
157, at 1259 (discussing the interests in citizen participation in financing politics and giving
them more influence); Pasquale, supra note 39, at 602 (advocating for a democratic process
that protects against one group accumulating too much influence in the political field);
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (1994) (proposing a total
public financing of congressional campaigns); Stephanopoulos, supra note 43, at 304
(discussing democratic theory and its approach to alignment); Zephyr Teachout,
Constitutional Purpose and the Anti-Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 200, 201
(2014) (addressing how courts should distinguish between competing constitutional
purposes).
178
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Solveig Singleton, Reviving A First Amendment Absolutism for
the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 290 (1999) (arguing in favor of a more absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment).
179
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014). The Court states:
The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to
safeguard basic First Amendment rights. In addition, “[i]n drawing
that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of
protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”
Id.
180
See Zephyr Teachout, Constitutional Change and Manageable Standards, HUFF. POST:
POLITICS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zephyr-teachout/bob-bauer-
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Roberts disregards the real-world harms of striking the aggregate
contribution limit.181 Nor does the Chief Justice refuse to find against the
First Amendment rights of speakers in certain contexts.182
More generally, Chief Justice Roberts’ approach to campaign finance
is riddled with inconsistencies.183 For example, Professor Hasen has
questioned whether Citizens United can be squared with Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., in which the Court held that recusal was required
“when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent.”184 Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts’s
commitment to the value of unbridled speech even in the context of
campaign finance is difficult to square with Bluman v. FEC, in which the
Court summarily affirmed an appellate court decision upholding a ban
on campaign contributions from foreign nationals.185

and-constitutio_b_4690394.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U58T-QKLL (discussing
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), which
upheld a federal statute prohibiting the provision of material support or resources to
certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity).
181
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken together with
Citizens United . . . today’s decision eviscerates our Nations campaign finance laws, leaving
a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that
those laws were intended to resolve.”).
182
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007) (holding that a minor child in a
school setting was not free to hold a sign saying “Bong hits 4 Jesus”); Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006) (holding that speech by a government employee pursuant to his
public position is not protected by the First Amendment).
183
See Chief Justice Roberts, Voting Rights, and Campaign Finance: Easier to Donate, Harder to
ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR.
(Nov.
11,
2014),
Vote,
CONSTITUTIONAL
http://theusconstitution.org/media/releases/chief-justice-roberts-voting-rights-andcampaign-finance-easier-donate-harder-vote, archived at http://perma.cc/3LUQ-8Z25
(“There is no constitutional right that is guaranteed in more provisions of the Constitution
than the right to vote, but in [Roberts’] view, the right to contribute is on par with the right
to vote.”).
184
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 606, 610, 612 (2011).
185
800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012); Rick Hasen,
Breaking News: Supreme Court Affirms that First Amendment Not Violated by Barring Foreign
Individuals from Spending Money (or Contributing) in U.S. Elections, ELECTION L. BLOG (Jan. 9,
2012, 7:38 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=27557, archived at http://perma.cc/U3VX2GMW.
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D. Chief Justice Roberts Has Shifted the Campaign Finance Analytical
Framework, Privileging the Right of the Powerful to Use Their Resources to
Influence Policy-Making Over the Right of the Public to Participate
In the wake of Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, Professor Hill
presciently identified an important shift—authored by Chief Justice
Roberts—in the Supreme Court’s approach to its campaign finance
jurisprudence as compared to its approach in McConnell v. FEC, which
was issued just four years earlier.186 Professor Hill explains that the
McConnell Court used a “democratic integrity framework” with a
“public participation agenda” that viewed the use of campaign
contributions and expenditures to gain access to and influence with
policy decision-makers as corrupt.187 But, in Wisconsin Right to Life, Chief
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion set forth a new framework that treated
the campaign finance issues under a “political speech framework” with a
“corporate political speech agenda,” resulting in characterizations of
campaign finance regulations as speech bans that unconstitutionally
burdened the rights of corporations to spend their general treasury
funds to influence the political process.188 The seed of this new
framework ripened in the Citizens United decision and flowered in
McCutcheon.189
In McCutcheon, one sees this same framework, only with wealthy
contributors subbing in for the corporate party in Wisconsin Right to
Life.190 Again, Chief Justice Roberts appears to have a special solicitude
for the ostensible right of powerful interests to use their monetary
resources to influence the political process.191 For example, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opening lines equate campaign contributions with voting as
though they were normatively similar types of democratic
engagement.192 Similarly, he later equates contributors with voting
constituents.193

186
Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New Framework for
Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 267,
269 (2008).
187
Id.
188
Id. at 268.
189
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (citing the Court’s holding).
190
See id. (analyzing the Court’s reasoning).
191
Id.
192
Id. at 1440–41.
193
Id. at 1461–62; see Joey Fishkin, Who is a Constituent?, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 30, 2014,
5:58 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/04/who-is-constituent.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/3A9F-RRKC (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the McCutcheon
case and the definition of constituency).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/11

Kennedy and Katsuya Endo: The World According to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It

2015]

McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters

565

In applying the political speech framework with this agenda, Chief
Justice Roberts effectively tears down traditional barriers between the
economic and political spheres.194 In a recent commentary, Professor
Stone gives a few examples that highlight the absurdity of breaking
down this division, which would result in letting economic power enable
the wealthy to exercise additional political power.195 For example, he
suggests that it would be ridiculous if a rich candidate complained that
giving equal time in a debate to all of the competitors was unfair and
unconstitutional because the rich candidate was prevented from buying
additional debate time.196 Professor Stone’s examples culminate in a
hypothetical in which wealthy individuals or corporations argue that
they should be allowed to purchase additional votes for $100 per vote.197
In other words, virtually everybody—even Chief Justice Roberts, who
has never publicly questioned the constitutionality of prohibiting the
selling of votes—agrees that there are areas of the political sphere in
which individuals are rightly prohibited from using their money to fully
express their views due to concerns of undemocratic domination.198
V. AFTER MCCUTCHEON: WHERE ARE WE NOW AND WHERE ARE WE
GOING?
This Article demonstrates that the Roberts Court embarked on a
radical deregulatory project in the area of money in politics, striking
down laws meant to promote participation, representation, and
accountability while fighting corruption, domination, and alienation.199
194
See The Democracy We Left Behind, supra note 17, at 1–2 (discussing how the Court’s
Establishment Clause and campaign finance jurisprudence interacts); McCutcheon, 134 S.
Ct. at 1441 (citing and invoking Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam)); see
also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100
(Basic Books, Inc. 1983) (“Political power and influence cannot be bought and sold.”);
Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 93–94 (May 11–12, 1998), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/ato-z/s/sandel00.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9HE8-R72C (illustrating the powerful
social and political tendencies of today).
195
Geoffrey R. Stone, The First Amendment Doesn’t Protect the Right to Buy the American
Government, THE DAILY BEAST (April 5, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/04/05/the-first-amendment-doesn-t-protect-the-right-to-buy-the-americangovernment.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E7C4-2A2L.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing en banc), amended (Apr. 20, 2005)).
199
See Jeffrey Toobin, The John Roberts Project, NEW YORKER (Apr. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-john-roberts-project, archived at
http://perma.cc/AT5V-LC9F (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ project).
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These changes in the law allow economically powerful people and
interests to have a much greater voice in electoral outcomes and policy
choices than non-wealthy Americans. This leads to serious problems for
the integrity and legitimacy of our democracy and for the public policies
that affect people’s lives. But while much damage has been done, there
are reasons to be hopeful that we are reaching a crucial turning point
that will allow jurisprudential shifts and policy changes to progress
together. There is powerful, widespread disagreement with the Court’s
current approach, which has only grown since Citizens United and
McCutcheon.200
Even as things stand within the current constrained understanding
of constitutionally allowed restraints on rules for money in politics, there
are many policy solutions available to counter the improper influence of
money in politics. Voluntary public financing programs enhance the
voice of small donors and promote constituent contact, contribution and
other limits fight corruption and capture (and its appearance), and
disclosure requirements provide voters with critical information with
which to make decisions and hold political actors accountable.
But it is important to recognize that in the long term we must change
the constitutional understanding of the protections for the use of money
to gain and exercise political influence. We must reject the First
Amendment fundamentalism that precludes consideration of democratic
values that are central to the goals and role of the First Amendment and
our constitutional structure of a self-governing republic. The Supreme
Court must adopt a constitutional understanding that empowers people
to limit the improper influence of money in politics and places people,
not money, at the center of our democracy.
A. McCutcheon Has Caused Policy Changes, but Effective Policies Remain
Constitutional
1.

In the Wake of McCutcheon, States Have Abandoned Aggregate
Contribution Limits

In the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts noted
that eight states have statutes setting aggregate contribution limits.201
200
See Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/SW6R-HJ6F (analyzing the different approaches Chief Justice Roberts
applied in both Citizens United and McCutcheon).
201
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451–52 & n.7 (2013) (listing the eight states:
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/11

Kennedy and Katsuya Endo: The World According to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It

2015]

McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters

567

Although not mentioned by Chief Justice Roberts, the District of
Columbia and Kentucky also have similar statutes.202 Within four
months after the McCutcheon decision, state officials from each of these
polities expressed their understanding that the statutes are no longer
enforceable or will be repealed.203 Additionally, the Vermont legislature
passed aggregate contribution limits, but the statute delayed
implementation until after the McCutcheon decision was issued and had
a provision invalidating the limits if the analogous federal laws were
found to be unconstitutional.204
D.C. CODE § 1-1131.01(b), (d) (repealed 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.150(10) (West
2014).
203
Anthony J. Castagno, Advisory Opinion 2014-03: Application and Enforcement of
Connecticut’s Aggregate Contribution Limits from Individuals to Candidates and Committees After
McCutcheon, ST. OF CONN. ST. ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMM’N (May 14, 2014), available
at http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/ao_2014-03.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/X67K-NS6M; MATT NESE, STATE AGGREGATE LIMITS AND PROPORTIONAL
BANS UNDER MCCUTCHEON: LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR HIGHLY VULNERABLE 12 (July
2014) (citing Letter from Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, to David Keating, May 21,
2014), available at http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/201410-22_Issue-Review_McCutcheon_State-Aggregate-Limits-And-Proportional-Bans-UnderMcCutcheon.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ED83-ZHBH; Emily Dennis, Advisory
Opinion 2014-003, KEN. REGIS. OF ELECTION FIN. (Jun. 5, 2014), available at
http://kref.ky.gov/Contributions/2014_003_Opinion.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/FJ5A-JC9X; Policy Statement of the Maine Ethics Commission on Enforceability
of Aggregate Contribution Limits, ST. OF ME. COMM’N ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS & ELECTION
PRACS. (2014), available at http://www.maine.gov/ethics/pdf/ProposedStatement
NottoEnforceAggLimit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KX8A-KVHT; Bobbie S. Mack et
al., Contribution Limits, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS (Apr. 11, 2014), available at
http://elections.maryland.gov/campaign_finance/documents/aggregate_limits_04112014
_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X4N6-3V3B; OCPF’s Statement on Today’s Supreme
Court Decision, McCutcheon vs. FEC, MASS. OFFICE OF CAMPAIGN AND POL. FIN. (Apr. 2,
2014), available at http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2014/07/08/uneforceable-statesrespond-to-mccutcheon-and-support-the-first-amendment/, archived at http://perma.cc/
X5HZ-QKCX; Michael Gormley, State: No Limit on Individual Political Donations, NEWSDAY
(May 26, 2014), available at http://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/state-no-limiton-individual-political-donations-1.8186788, archived at http://perma.cc/VQ8X-MHJW;
Michael P. McKinney, R.I. Board of Elections Backs Repeal of ‘Total’ Campaign Contribution
Limit, R.I. PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.providencejournal.com/
breaking-news/content/20140417-r.i.-board-of-elections-backs-repeal-of-total-campaigncontribution-limit.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/46GJ-5UB7; Order at 1, Young v. Vocke
(E.D. Wis. May 22, 2014) (No. 13-CV-635), available at http://gab.wi.gov/
sites/default/files/news/young_v_vocke_dkt_12_order_pdf_80804.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/S7NL-S6BH; Laura Hancock, Wyoming Lawmakers Want to Repeal Caps to
PAC Spending, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jun. 6, 2014), available at http://trib.com/news/stateand-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-lawmakers-want-to-repeal-caps-to-pacspending/article_9a4c8196-d5ff-5eb3-a99b-a53214e8e8d7.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/WGM8-NZV5.
204
See 17 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2941 (West 2014) (providing the limitations of contributions
for candidates running for State Representative, State Senator, local office, county office, or
202

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 11

568
2.

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Other Policies are Under Attack from Opponents of Campaign
Finance Regulations Emboldened by the Decision

As discussed above, the plurality decision in McCutcheon,
particularly when coupled with the Citizens United decision, marks a
dramatic shift in the Court’s approach to campaign finance
regulations.205 It was the first time that the Court entirely invalidated a
category of limits that had been upheld in Buckley.206 It was also only the
second time that a federal contribution limit was invalidated.207
Illustrating the potential for change, a state court judge even cited
McCutcheon in support of overturning decades-old precedent.208 Perhaps
in response to the Roberts Court’s apparent hostility towards campaign
finance regulations, a number of new cases have been filed, challenging
the policies that remain. Additionally, litigants in pending cases have
attempted to apply McCutcheon’s reasoning.
There have been several lawsuits challenging different types of
contribution limits.209 For example, the Republican National Committee
for the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Auditor
of Accounts, or Attorney General).
205
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Court’s rejection of prior case law regarding
aggregate limits and the governmental interest in preventing corruption); see also Jonathan
S. Berkon & Marc E. Elias, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. 373, 379 (2014) (addressing
the consequences after the Supreme Court’s McCutcheon decision).
206
See Fred Wertheimer, The McCutcheon Case: The Legal and Political Consequences If the
Supreme Court Strikes down Overall Contribution Limits, DEMOCRACY 21 (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.democracy21.org/inside-the-courts/press-releases-inside-the-courts/themccutcheon-casethe-legal-and-political-consequences-if-the-supreme-court-strikes-downoverall-contribution-limits, archived at http://perma.cc/A4YQ-B2F9 (discussing the legal
and political consequences of ruling against contribution limits in campaigns); Georgina
Yeomans, Reactions to McCutcheon from a Law Student, ACS BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/mccutcheon-v.-federal-election-commission, archived
at http://perma.cc/QP4G-72QM (reacting to the Court’s decision in McCutcheon).
207
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (striking down BCRA’s prohibition on
contributions from minors).
208
New Jersey v. Buckner, 96 A.3d 261, 280–81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (Harris,
J.A.D., dissenting) (discussing a challenge to a thirty-nine-year-old statute that authorizes
the New Jersey Supreme Court to recall retired judges for temporary service, including
those who have reached age seventy).
209
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2014)
(No. 1:14-cv-01345), available at http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/NY_Republicans_
v_SEC_-_P2P_Complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3Y7K-M4B6 (challenging a
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission as violating the Administration
Procedure Act and the First Amendment); Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Holmes v.
FEC (D.D.C. July 21, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-01243), available at http://www.campaign
freedom.org/2014/07/21/holmes-v.-fec-complaint/, archived at http://perma.cc/BK2CHEWJ (challenging the bifurcated contribution limits under the Federal Election Campaign
Act); Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. FEC (D.D.C. May 23, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00853), available at http://www.fec.
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and the Republican Party of Louisiana state committee challenged BCRA
provisions that prohibit national and state political party committees
from forming non-contribution accounts, which could accept unlimited
contributions into a “separate bank account for the purpose of financing
independent expenditures, other advertisements that refer to a Federal
candidate, and generic voter drives.”210 Additionally, the Center for
Competitive Politics identified ten states that have contribution limits
that might be vulnerable under the reasoning of the McCutcheon
plurality, such as Hawaii’s prohibition on candidates accepting more
than 30% of their contributions from non-residents.211 And, in assessing
Minnesota’s special-sources contribution limits, which were also
identified by the Center for Competitive Politics as being vulnerable, a
federal district court relied on McCutcheon to enjoin the regulations
despite voicing reservations about the wisdom of the precedent.212

gov/law/litigation/rnc_rnc_complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LT3J-SCHC
(challenging the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 regarding the
First Amendment); Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Rufer v.
FEC (D.D.C. May 21, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00837-CRC), available at http://www.fec.gov/
law/litigation/rufer_rufer_complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M55G-NU7P
(challenging the independent expenditure of a “non-connected” political party);
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Wills v.
Mead (D. Wy. July 2, 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-00126), available at http://wyliberty.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/WillsvMead-PI-Memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PK6SLWFZ (challenging that a statute under the Wyoming Election Code restrains political
speech and violates the First Amendment); Decision and Order on Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Woodhouse v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices
(D. Me. Aug. 22, 2014) (No. 14-cv-266), available at http://scholar.google.com/
scholar_case?case=14284777011250628071&q=woodhouse+v.+maine+commission+on+gov
ernmental+ethics+and+election+practices&hl=en&as_sdt=800006&as_vis=1, archived at
http://perma.cc/3P2T-7LNS (arguing for a preliminary injunction ordering Maine to
permit its residents to double their contributions for independent candidates for
governor).
210
Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. FEC (D.D.C. May 23, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00853), available at http://www.fec.
gov/press/Press2011/20111006postcarey.shtm, archived at http://perma.cc/J82H-ZG5E
(quoting Press Release, FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC, Reporting Guidance for Political
Committees that Maintain a Non–Contribution Account (Oct. 5, 2011)).
211
Matt Nese, State Aggregate Limits and Proportional Bans Under McCutcheon: Likely
Unconstitutional or Highly Vulnerable, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS (July 8, 2014),
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-07-08_IssueReview_McCutcheon_State-Aggregate-Limits-And-Proportional-Bans-UnderMcCutcheon.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6MK3-UV9B (describing seven different
types of contribution limits in Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
212
See Seaton v. Wiener, 2014 WL 2081898, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“While the
Court may not agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment in
this regard, and echoes the concerns of other courts that have addressed similar issues in
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Additionally, notwithstanding the McCutcheon plurality’s positive
take on disclosure, these regulations have been challenged—perhaps
because they are one of the last remaining bulwarks.213 For example,
Citizens United has challenged New York’s requirement that non-profit
corporations must file IRS Form 990 Schedule B, which lists contributors
before they may engage in solicitation or advocacy in the state.214
But McCutcheon does not appear to provide new ammunition with
which to attack disclosure regulations, as several courts have cited it for
its approval of such requirements.215 For example, in a case before the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Stop This Insanity
argued that FECA provisions preventing its segregated fund from
soliciting the entire public while concealing its expenses for such
solicitation were unconstitutional.216 The appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint and the denial of its motion for
preliminary judgment, in part, noting that McCutcheon “endorsed
disclosure as ‘a particularly effective means of arming the voting public
with information.’”217 Other campaign finance policies, such as the
federal pay-to-play ban and anti-coordination rules, that have been and
will continue to be challenged, will likely have to address the
McCutcheon plurality’s decision as well.218

light of McCutcheon, the Court is nonetheless bound by the decisions of the Supreme
Court.”).
213
See Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1445 (2014) (arguing an
inconsistency in FEC’s compliance with disclosure regimes).
214
Citizens United v. Schneiderman, No. 1:2014cv03704 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014); see also
Citizens United v. Scott Gessler et al., No. 14-cv-02266 (D. Co. Aug. 14, 2014) (challenging
the applicability of Colorado’s disclosure requirements to the organization).
215
See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining
disclosure requirements); Democratic Governors Ass'n v. Brandi, 2014 WL 2589279, at *20
(D. Conn. June 10, 2014) (“[C]ourts . . . have not found the additional reporting and
organizational burdens that accompany political committee registration to be
unconstitutional . . .”); Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 2014 WL
3824225, at *1, *6 (D.C.C. Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing that the Federal Election Campaign Act
permitted limited corporate participation).
216
Stop This Insanity, Inc., 2014 WL 3824225, at *1–2.
217
Id. at *6 (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014)).
218
See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1009 (D.D.C. 2013) (summarizing Wagner v. FEC
and the U.S. District Court’s upholding of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s prohibition
on federal contractors’ contributions to federal elections); O'Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp.
3d 861, 868 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014), rev’d O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014)
(addressing the scope of the Court’s preliminary injunction against continuing to conduct
the John Doe investigation).
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Campaign Finance Policies Such as Base Contribution Limits,
Disclosure, and Public Financing Remain Constitutional

Notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’ deregulatory project and the
anti-reformers’ litigation activity, several important campaign finance
policy options remain constitutional—most notably, base contribution
limits, disclosure, and public financing. And, therefore, it is vitally
important that the public fights to protect these laws.219
In McCutcheon, the plurality reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the
federal base contribution limits.220 Only six states do not have campaign
contribution limits.221 These policies help limit the influence of big
money on legislative outputs and make elections more competitive,
enhancing the government’s accountability to each citizen.222
Additionally, the McCutcheon plurality wrote approvingly of disclosure
Every single state requires some disclosure of
regulations.223
contributions and expenditures.224 Such disclosure is understood to

219
Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign
Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 34 (2014) (“To begin with, it is important to
defend what remains of campaign finance law, and to continue pursuing and defending
legislation within the confines of Supreme Court precedent.”).
220
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (“Such rhetoric ignores the fact that
we leave the base limits undisturbed. Those base limits remain the primary means of
regulating campaign contributions . . . .”).
221
See State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct.
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_to_Candidates_20122014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc.GK6L-SV4P (using a chart to illustrate corporate to
candidate contribution limits by state).
222
Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 313–14 (1989). Mr. Lowenstein reports:
Some of these studies have reported no statistically significant
relationship between PAC contributions to House members and their
votes on bills of interest to the PACs; some have reported unavoidably
ambiguous results; some have reported statistically significant but modest
effects; and some have reported effects both substantial and statistically
significant.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign
Contribution Limits After Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 688 (2008)
(“Primo et al. also conclude that ‘individual contribution limits have a large, statistically
significant, and negative effect on the size of the winning vote margin [of gubernatorial
candidates], implying an increase in competitiveness.’”).
223
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459–60 (“Disclosure requirements burden speech, but—
unlike the aggregate limits—they do not impose a ceiling on speech. For that reason,
disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or
quantities of speech.” (internal citations omitted)).
224
Campaign Finance Reform: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 3,
2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-finance-anoverview.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/F89B-J944.
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contribute to an informed electorate.225 A recent study found evidence
that “states with more stringent campaign finance disclosure
requirements weigh citizens’ opinions more equally in the policymaking
process.”226 As such, this set of policies might even be an area ripe for
expansion.227 For example, in the federal system, agencies other than the
FEC—such as the Securities Exchange Commission—could require the
disclosure of funds used to influence elections.228
Although not at issue in McCutcheon, public financing remains a key
tool to democratize the influence of money in politics.229 Fourteen states,
in addition to some municipalities, provide some level of financial
support to candidates who voluntarily agree to abide by certain
These programs keep
spending and fundraising restrictions.230
candidates in contact with their constituencies, not just their large
donors, while promoting participation.231 They combat corruption and
its appearance, but also can enhance electoral competition.232 After
recognizing these benefits, there are efforts to introduce such schemes at
all levels of government.233
225
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (finding that disclosure allows voters to
place value on candidates rather than by political party). See generally Michael D. Gilbert,
Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1858–60
(2013) (explaining that disclosure helps voters to vote more competently).
226
Patrick Flavin, State Campaign Finance Laws and the Equality of Political Representation,
BAYLOR BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014), http://blogs.baylor.edu/patrick_j_flavin/files/2010/09/
Flavin_ELJ-1vsh6bv.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XFP7-XT9C.
227
See Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 213, at 1446 (“Expanding disclosure is
unquestionably critical if disclosure is to achieve the lofty goals we have assigned to it.”).
228
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The SEC and Dark Political Money: An Historical Argument for
Requiring Disclosure, CORP. REFORM COAL. 5 (June 18, 2013), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/sec-dark-political-money-history-report.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/W229-QTTF.
229
Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will
Affect the 2014 Election and Beyond, Submitted to the United States Senate Comm. on Rules
and Admin. (Apr. 30, 2014) (testimony of Liz Kennedy, Counsel, Demos),
http://www.demos.org/publication/dollars-and-sense-how-undisclosed-money-andpost-mccutcheon-campaign-finance-will-affect, archived at http://perma.cc/F5KZ-C9YN.
230
See Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan.
23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-ofcampaigns-overview.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/QB29-5ZQK (using a table to graph
candidate public financing programs).
231
Monica Youn, Small-Donor Public Financing in the Post-Citizens United Era, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 619, 634–35 (2011).
232
Id. at 629–34; see David Gartner, The Future of Clean Elections, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 737–
39 (2013) (describing early experience in Arizona with public financing scheme).
233
See, e.g., Lynn Thompson, Seattle City Council Considers Public Financing of Campaigns,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2020251169_campaignfinancexml.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/X3CQ-PJUA
(discussing Seattle’s consideration of a public financing program); Government by the People
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These policies are not necessarily magic bullets that will cure all of
the problems of concentrated wealth’s impact on democratic
government. They should be understood to work with each other, as
necessary but not necessarily sufficient, parts of an effective
comprehensive system of common sense rules for money in politics. But,
while the longer-term process of overturning the Roberts Court’s flawed
campaign finance jurisprudence proceeds, at minimum, they are
important interim measures that should be protected and promoted.
4.

Strong Public Demand for Comprehensive Structural Change Might
Result in a Constitutional Amendment

The campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court also prompted
calls for amending the Constitution.234 Currently, about two-thirds of
the American public supports an amendment.235 Legislators then heeded
this call with the introduction of a bill in the U.S. Senate that has been
sponsored by nearly fifty senators.236 The amendment stipulates that
“[t]o advance the fundamental principle of political equality for all, and
to protect the integrity of the legislative and electoral processes,
Congress shall have the power to regulate the raising and spending of
money and in-kind equivalents with respect to Federal
elections . . . [.]”237
Such a strategy is broadly in line with our country’s history. The
Constitution has been amended several times to overturn Court
precedent that was inconsistent with constitutional principles—as is the

Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. (2014), available at http://congressional.proquest.com/
congressional/docview/t01.d02.113_hr_20_ih?accountid=14811,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/UVZ5-HLX (explaining federal public financing bill introduced by
Representative Sarbanes).
234
Stephen Dinan, Senate Democrats Declare War on Roberts’ Supreme Court, Campaign
Finance Freedoms, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/apr/30/senate-dems-vow-vote-change-constitution/?page=all, archived at
http://perma.cc/8YCS-CQ2Q.
235
Daniel Weissglass, Poll Shows Strong Support for Constitutional Amendment Reining in
Big Money, COMMON CAUSE (July 31, 2014), http://www.commoncause.org/democracywire/new-poll-shows-strong-public-support-for-controlling-big-money-in-politics.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7Z7X-KAYB (“[65%] of voters believe that the current
campaign finance system is unacceptable”).
236
See S.J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the text of the bill); see also S.J. Res. 19–A
Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to
Contributions and Expenditures Intended to Affect Elections, CONGRESS.GOV (2013),
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/19/cosponsors,
archived at http://perma.cc/7EA-U45E (providing the cosponsors to the bill).
237
S.J. Res. 19, § 1, 113th Cong. (2013).
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Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.238 And, although the
road to a constitutional amendment is arduous, even unsuccessful
constitutional amendment campaigns can help bring about
jurisprudential evolution in the Court itself.239
B. Reformers Can Reclaim the Constitutional Foundations to Support
Democracy-Enhancing Campaign Finance Regulations
Despite the hostility of the Roberts Court to campaign finance
regulations, it is helpful to remember that it is only with the departure of
Justice O’Connor that the Court has adopted such an extreme antiregulation approach, breaking with a wider body of precedent. 240
Accordingly, we should not discount the possibility that progressive
change is equally possible. Such a constitutional correction might take
the form of a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, returning to
interpretations of the Constitution and First Amendment that envision a
democracy in which the size of a person’s wallet does not determine the
impact of her voice or his right to representation.241
1.

The Court Has Reversed Course to Correct Bad Decisions of Crucial
National Importance

The Supreme Court has come to reconsider its positions on issues of
fundamental importance to our nation before. For example, in 1896, the
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson approved the constitutionality of the doctrine
and practice of “separate but equal.”242 There, the Court interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law to
allow the government to discriminate on the basis of race in the

238
Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity of Marriage or
Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2005).
239
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 502 (2001) (“Because the women's movement did shift
public norms to a relatively anti-discrimination baseline, it was able to do through the
Equal Protection Clause virtually everything the ERA would have accomplished had it
been ratified and added to the Constitution.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA: 2005–06
Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2006) (explaining that even a
failed amendment is successful).
240
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 414 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only
relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this
Court.”).
241
See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971) (noting
that democracy signifies “the continuing responsiveness of the government to the
preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”).
242
163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).
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provision of public services through segregated facilities.243 This
constitutional blessing led to the Jim Crow system of apartheid that
prevented racial integration and perpetuated racial subjugation for
decades.244 These policies were challenged gradually through a strategic
litigation campaign leading up to and during the Civil Rights era,
culminating in the 1954 decision, Brown v. Board of Education, that held
that separate but equal was no longer a constitutionally-permissible
excuse for racial segregation, because separate schools on the basis of
race were unequal by definition.245
In the early twentieth century, the Court actively struck down
legislative efforts to improve working conditions and protect workers
through minimum wage and maximum hour laws.246 At the time, a
majority of justices adopted the view that the Constitution meant that
people had a right to buy and sell their labor at whatever price they were
able to get and that government didn’t have a constitutional role to play
in setting ground rules for economic relationships.247 In the famous case,
Lochner v. New York, which gave this judicial era its name, the Court
found that this “liberty of contract” meant that New York couldn’t adopt
a law limiting the number of hours bakers could be made to work in a
day or week.248 But Congress and the states kept reacting to the
untenable economic relationships that existed at the time by adopting
economic regulations.249 After much political organizing and an open
struggle amongst President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Congress, and
the Court, the Court changed its mind and adopted a new understanding
that government had the constitutional authority to regulate the
economy through its power to protect the general welfare and the public
Id. at 542–43.
See James W. Fox Jr., Doctrinal Myths and the Management of Cognitive Dissonance: Race,
Law, and the Supreme Court's Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293, 315
(2005) (opining that Plessy v. Ferguson was “the lynchpin for legal support for Jim Crow”).
245
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding there is no place for
separate but equal in public education); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory
Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 35 n.155 (2010) (explaining the cause of Brown v. Board of
Education).
246
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1469, 1507–08 (2005) (describing a renaissance of Lochner during the 1920s).
247
Id. at 1508; see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two
Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & LIB. 370, 384–86 (2005) (discussing contractual
freedom and protection of due process).
248
198 U.S. 45, 51 (1905).
249
See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2005)
(discussing the basis of Lochner in the development of sociological jurisprudence, while
reformers were continually discouraged from fighting for protections). But see Lochner’s
Legacy, supra note 163, at 873 (explaining the legacy of Lochner as having been a deciding
case for most of the influential cases regardless of their impact on governmental practices).
243
244
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interest; suddenly, minimum wage laws and other economic regulations
were constitutional.250 Today, the Lochner era—and the constitutional
theory that prevented people from adopting laws necessary to order
their society—has been discredited and has gone down as one of the
Court’s biggest errors.251
2.

The Court’s Current Money in Politics Jurisprudence is Unstable,
Unpopular, and Devoid of Critical Democratic Values

Already, the Roberts Court’s money in politics jurisprudence has
been heavily criticized by significant portions of the legal community.252
Former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School Geoffrey Stone
wrote “[t]hat these five justices persist in invalidating these regulations
under a perverse and unwarranted interpretation of the First
Amendment is, to be blunt, a travesty. These decisions will come to be
counted as among the worst decisions in the history of the Supreme
Court.”253 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that “I think the biggest
mistake this [C]ourt made is in campaign finance . . . . It should be
increasingly clear how [money] is corrupting our system.”254 Retired
Justice John Paul Stevens criticized Chief Justice Roberts’ McCutcheon
opinion, saying “[t]he voter is less important than the man who provides
money to the candidate. . . . It’s really wrong.”255
The Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions have occasioned
strong commentary from other members of the federal judiciary.
Leading Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi has written “all is not
well with this law” because:
The ability to express one's feelings with all the intensity
that one has—and to be heard—is a central element of
the right to speak freely. It is, I believe, something that
is so fundamental that sooner or later it is going to be
250
See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We
Want to Be with the "Equalerty" of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 220, 240 (2010) (stating that the state had an interest in regulation, but that its
powers were limited).
251
See Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 163, at 874 (opining that Lochner was wrong).
252
See Maria Coyle, Ginsburg on Rulings, Race, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/printerfriendly/id=1202667692557,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/3AQF-MJVJ (discussing the challenging of the disparate-impact theory).
253
Stone, supra note 195.
254
Coyle, supra note 252.
255
Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong Direction’,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/
justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-wrong-direction.html?_r=2&assetType=nyt_
now, archived at http://perma.cc/U453-XBK6.
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recognized.
Whether this will happen through a
constitutional amendment or through changes in
Supreme Court doctrine, I do not know. But it will
happen. Rejection of it is as flawed as was the rejection
of the concept of one-person-one-vote. And just as
constitutional law eventually came to embrace that
concept, so too will it come to accept the importance of
the antidistortion interest in the law of campaign
finance.256
In a case involving a challenge to a New York statute that limited
total contributions by individuals to $150,000 per year, Judge Paul Crotty
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York criticized
the McCutcheon decision, writing:
One thing is certain: large political donations do not
inspire confidence that the government in a
representative democracy will do the right thing. . . . In
other words, he who pays the piper calls the tune.
Indeed, today's reality is that the voices of “we the
people” are too often drowned out by the few who have
great resources. And when the fundraising cycle slows
(it never stops), lobbyists take over in a continuing
attempt to gain influence over and access to elected
officials. This is not a left or right, liberal or conservative
analysis, but all the points on the political spectrum are
increasingly involved in shaping this country's political
agenda. In today's never-ending cycle of campaigning
and lobbying; lobbying and campaigning, elected
officials know where their money is coming from and
that it must keep coming if they are to stay in office.
Ordinary citizens recognize this; they know what is
going on; they know they are not being included. It
breeds cynicism and distrust. . . .
[I]nfluence bought by money is no different than a bribe,
and as the Book of Exodus 23:8 counsels, “a bribe blinds
the clear-sighted and is the ruin of the just man's cause.”
But without knowing what is in a politician's or donor's
mind, it is almost impossible to know where to draw the
256

Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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line. Legislators are well acquainted with these dangers.
Based on their experiences, legislators have drawn the
line by crafting contribution limitations like those
contained in New York Election Laws §§ 14–114(8) and
14–126.257
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit offered a more personal critique.258 After describing
Chief Justice Roberts’ view of corruption and elected officials’
responsiveness to donors, Posner asked, “[c]an so naive-seeming a
conception of the political process reflect the actual beliefs of the
Judge Posner then
intellectually sophisticated chief justice?”259
answered:
Maybe so, but one is entitled to be skeptical. Obviously,
wealthy businessmen and large corporations often make
substantial political contributions in the hope (often
fulfilled) that by doing so they will be buying the
support of politicians for policies that yield financial
benefits to the donors. The legislator who does not
honor the implicit deal is unlikely to receive similar
donations in the future. By honoring the deal he is not
just being “responsive” to the political “views and
concerns” of constituents; he is buying their financial
support with currency consisting of votes for legislation
valuable to his benefactors. Isn’t this obviously a form of
corruption?260

257
N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 2014 WL 1641781, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2014); see Seaton v. Wiener, 2014 WL 2081898, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“While the
Court may not agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment in
this regard, and echoes the concerns of other courts that have addressed similar issues in
light of McCutcheon, the Court is nonetheless bound by the decisions of the Supreme
Court.”).
258
See Rick Hasen, Whoa: Judge Posner Attacks Chief Justice Roberts Truthfulness in
Campaign Finance Case, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 25, 2014, 11:35 AM), http://electionlaw
blog.org/?p=62770, archived at http://perma.cc/6D9Y-PLKD (critiquing Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon).
259
Richard A. Posner, Does Chief Justice John Roberts Show a Certain Casualness About the
Truth?, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_is_robe
rts_casual_about_the_truth_in_the_campaign_finance.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
KG2C-3Q46. The tone of these statements has come under some criticism. Hasen, supra
note 258.
260
Posner, supra note 259; Hasen, supra note 258.
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In the cases before the Court, some of the justices themselves also have
criticized the new framework.261 And even members of the McCutcheon
plurality have stated that recently decided five-to-four decisions with
vigorous dissents are entitled to less deference.262 These conditions are
present in all of the Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.263
As such, it might be possible to guide an evolution in the case law that
recognizes the constitutional value of a democracy in which money does
not dictate the strength of one’s political voice and influence.
One court-based avenue towards change would focus on building an
empirical record similar to that relied upon by the McConnell Court,
which will reveal the reality-disconnect of the legal fictions employed by
the Roberts Court.264 Some of this work has already begun. For
example, the Tokaji and Strause report describes the real-world effects of
independent campaign expenditures, which undercuts some of the
factual assumptions made by the majority in Citizens United, particularly
that this spending is truly independent.265 It is possible that similar
research might call into question the McCutcheon plurality’s
assumptions. For example, we already have seen the development of
joint fundraising committees that can garner six-figure checks—a
possibility dismissed by the McCutcheon plurality as implausible.
The Court can’t keep ignoring the reality that politics and policy
making at all levels of government continue to be captured by the donor
261
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1465 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken
together with Citizens United . . . today’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance
laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic
legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.”).
262
See Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82
Geo. L.J. 1689, 1689 & n.2 (1994) (critiquing a new approach to stare decisis).
263
See id. at 1712 (“If 5-4 decisions were more subject to reversal, individuals would be
uncertain as to whether a 5-4 decision would continue to retain five votes and should be
followed, or whether it likely would be overruled . . . .”).
264
See Goldberg & Wright, supra note 222, at 690 (explaining that electoral competition
might provide ammunition for spend-down provisions). See generally L. Paige Whitaker,
Convinced by the Record. Showing an Appearance of Corruption: The Supreme Court Upholds the
Groundbreaking McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Law, 51 FED. LAW. 26, 32 (Aug. 2004)
(“The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC rewarded the proponents of McCainFeingold for thoroughly building a record demonstrating that the former campaign finance
system had created an appearance of corruption. Throughout its opinion, the Court relied
upon the evidentiary record they had established.”).
265
See TOKAJI & STRAUSS, supra note 79, at 60–69 (reporting the effects of independent
campaign expenditures); see also Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 132–
34, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing the impact of outside spending as a reality for
campaigns); O'Keefe v. Schmitz, 2014 WL 1795139, at *5, *7 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014) (finding
that without prearranged expenditures with the candidate, the value of expenditures is
undermined).
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class, particularly as those most involved in the process continue to tell
their stories. Regarding the experience of political campaigns in North
Carolina after Citizens United, State Senator Floyd McKissick testified to
the U.S. Senate that:
Suddenly, no matter what the race was, money came
flooding in. . . . Overall, three quarters of all the outside
money in state races that year were tied to one man: Art
Pope. Pope and his associates poured money into
[twenty-two] targeted races, and the candidates they
backed won in [eighteen]. In 2012, $8.1 million in
outside money flooded into the governor’s race—a large
portion of which was tied to Mr. Pope. And before he’d
even been sworn into office, our new governor
announced who would be writing the new state budget:
surprise, surprise. It was Art Pope.266
In addition to empirical work, important conceptual progress would
involve the Supreme Court reconsidering the assumptions that led it to
treat money as equivalent to speech in the campaign finance context.267
Nothing in the pre-Buckley First Amendment jurisprudence required the
conclusion that certain uses of money are equivalent to speech.268 For
example, the lower court in Buckley applied the O’Brien standard, which
differentiates between expressive and non-expressive conduct.269
The relationship between financial power and political power in a
republic is too important to leave to unelected judges to determine
266
Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing: Examining a Constitutional
Amendment to Restore Democracy to the American People, 113th Cong. 1–2 (June 3, 2014),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-03-14McKissickTestimony.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/G266-WPWC (statement of Floyd McKissick, Jr.).
267
See Levinson, supra note 155, at 896 (arguing that the Court erred in equating money
with speech).
268
See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001,
1019 (1976) (referencing that money does not communicate ideas); see also Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the power of
speech and money). The Court states:
Money is property; it is not speech. Speech has the power to inspire
volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a
battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, has the
power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not
follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same
measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as
it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results.
Id.
269
See Levinson, supra note 155, at 896 (explaining that the O’Brien framework was
rejected in Buckley).
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without any consideration for the public consensus about the nature of
our democracy. It is not enough to tinker with a jurisprudence that has
left a few campaign finance protections constitutionally viable while
crippling the development of comprehensive systems that can protect
democratic self-government from the depredations of market capitalism.
We need an understanding of the constitutional role of money in
democracy that protects not just a few wealthy individuals and interests
but also the people’s interests in a representative government free of the
improper influence of concentrated wealth.
VI. CONCLUSION
McCutcheon is another step in the Roberts Court’s campaign to roll
back the country’s campaign finance protections. Just as sophisticated
political players adapted to new circumstances in the wake of Citizens
United, the practical impact of the McCutcheon decision is already being
felt in the rise in joint fundraising committees. Allowing greater use of
concentrated wealth to impact elections and wield political power will
exacerbate the democratic harms that are already damaging our republic
and creating a crisis of confidence in our American democracy.
The twin decisions of McCutcheon and Citizens United marked a
turning point in the effort to reclaim a pro-democracy understanding of
the Constitution, and huge bipartisan majorities have responded by
demanding comprehensive common sense rules for the use of money in
politics. The Court can only stay so far out of touch for so long before
correcting course and acknowledging that, to maintain a democratic
republic, the people must have the power to protect politics and policy
making from domination by the donor class.
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